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This thesis examines the history and current trends of international maritime 
terrorism to show that terrorists may soon determine that small boat attacks may be the 
most cost-effective and successful terrorism strategy. This review determined that 
increasingly successful worldwide piracy attacks and the effective use of detection-
evading drug vessels, may increase the risk of a terrorist attack in United States’ waters.  
These reviews and lessons learned from other nations’ successful responses to the 
maritime threat, in coordination with the goals outlined in the DHS Small Vessel Security 
Strategy, led to this author’s recommendations that (1) the local U.S. maritime 
community members must be better encouraged by Coast Guard members to become 
involved in observing and reporting suspicious activities; (2) the Coast Guard and other 
local law enforcement agencies must investigate and prioritize those areas that might be 
used as a staging area for a small boat attack and increase their presence activities in 
those locations; (3) the use of up-to-date technology must be a part of any small boat 
terrorist deterrence plan; and (4) the U.S. must be prepared with a plan to respond to a 
successful small boat attack, including possible increased regulations and restrictions on 
the maritime community.  
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After the tragic and surprising events of 9/11, the United States became aware of 
the almost endless possible means of attacks against it.  Maritime security, after airline 
security, quickly became one of the nation’s greatest areas of concern,1 as commercial 
aircraft and ships were no longer seen by the public as “benign tools for commerce and 
leisure, but as potential weapons.”2 The vulnerabilities of the United States in the 
maritime realm are obvious: while there are 5,525 miles of border with Canada and 1,989 
miles of border with Mexico, there are approximately 95,000 miles of U.S. shoreline and 
3.4 million squares miles in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the U.S.3   
The U.S. maritime industry and economy is surely a prime target of al-Qa’ida, 
given that organization’s “modus operandi of continuous attempts to strike at the heart of 
the American economy and symbolic targets, just as it did in the September 11 attacks 
against the World Trade Center.”4 The maritime industry is a huge contributor to the 
nation’s economy, as over 95% of the U.S.’s imports and exports are sent via ships from 
the U.S.’s more than 361 ports,5 and any shut down of the nation’s port would have a 
ripple effect throughout the economy.  For example, a port security ‘war game’ in 2002 
estimated that a nine day shutdown of all ports in the U.S. after some type of maritime 
attack would cost approximately $74 billion, while a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) 
type attack in a port could amount to a cost of $1.3 trillion in lost trade.6 Maritime 
                                                 
1 Martin Murphy, “The Role of ‘Public-Private Partnership’ in Maritime Awareness and Security,” 
October 16, 2007, www.fletcher.tufts.edu/jebsencenter/pdfs/Murphy_SpecialRelease_11-2007_FINAL.pdf. 
The commercial shipping industry realized that the 9/11 attacks changed perceptions of terrorism in the 
U.S. and, in particular, induced feelings of vulnerability that the country had not felt previously in its 
history.” 
2 Ibid. 
3 Thomas Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Statement before the Select Committee 
on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, February 12, 2004, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_0019.shtm. 
4 Joshua Sinai, “Future Trends in Worldwide Maritime Terrorism,” The Quarterly Journal III, no. 1, 
(2004): 63. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Mike Buky, “Maritime Terrorism: The Threat from Small Vessels,” Maritime Studies 157 (2007): 1-
11. 
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terrorism, no matter what the technique or the location of the attack, has the same 
objective as all terror attacks, i.e., causing mass casualties and/or damaging the economic 
welfare and security of those opposed by the group staging the attack.  
The Coast Guard has described the maritime domain as  
one of the least governed regions left on earth. Many millions of square 
miles of ocean are a global commons under no nation’s jurisdiction . . . 
much of the ocean is only lightly governed and its maritime borders are 
generally less restricted and are freely accessible to transit without 
mechanism for detection and investigation.7   
In the United States alone, there are over 350 official ports of entry for cargo, and an 
average of six million containers entering U.S. ports each day.8   
Recognizing this vulnerability, funding for the U.S. Coast Guard and its maritime 
security mission quickly and greatly increased after 9/11, and the Homeland Security 
Department was created with the Coast Guard as one of its main agencies.9  Within the 
year, the Coast Guard was named as the lead federal agency in charge of maritime 
homeland security under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA).10 
MTSA also implemented various security regulations and policies targeting large vessels 
and port maritime facilities, including mandating that all such vessels to submit a 96-hour 
advance notice of arrival, applying extra scrutiny to all large foreign flag vessels, and 
requiring offshore boarding of vessels that rated out as “high interest vessels” under the 
Coast Guard’s High Interest Vessel Targeting Matrix.11   
                                                 
7 Thad Allen, “New Threats, New Challenges: The Coast Guard’s New Strategy,” U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings (March 2007): 75.  
8 U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta; testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, House of Representatives, December 6, 2001, 
http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/01test/Mineta11.htm. 
9 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 296, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., (November 25, 2002). 
10 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Public Law 295, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., (November 
25, 2002). 
11 Jane A. Bullock, George D. Haddow, and Damon P. Coppola, Introduction to Homeland Security 
(Butterworth-Heinemann Publishers 2006), 220-221. 
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MTSA and its enforcing regulations also vastly increased security requirements 
for ship-operating companies and for maritime facilities in U.S. ports.12 These companies 
and facilities were required to perform security vulnerability analyses and develop 
security plans to address those vulnerabilities.13  MTSA also implemented new required 
cooperation between port stakeholders by establishing an Area Maritime Security 
Committee (AMSC) at each major port.14  MTSA directed each AMSC to complete a 
vulnerability analysis of its port, and to create an Area Maritime Security Plan (AMSP) to 
address the identified vulnerabilities, as well as to hold regularly scheduled security 
exercises.15 Although the timeline for implementation of the regulations was short, the 
Coast Guard was uniformly praised for its quick overall successful progress toward the 
implementation of MSTA requirements.16  The Coast Guard also became more of an 
obviously armed force after 9/11, hoping to increase deterrence or confront a maritime 
terrorist attacker by arming its small boats with machine guns/crew served weapons.17 
In 2005, the United States published its National Plan to Achieve Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA),18 wherein it emphasized the need for the United States to be 
aware of vessels and cargo enroute to port in the United States, so that the vessels, their 
crew, and their cargo could be screened for possible threats to the United States before 
being allowed to enter U.S. ports.  The director of the Coast Guard’s MDA Program 
Integration Office defined the United State’s MDA program as “the effective 
                                                 
12 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 104 (vessels) and 105 (facilities), 2006 ed. 
13 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 104 and 105.  
14 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 103.300, 2006 ed. 
15 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 103.500 and 103.515, 2006 ed. 
16 Margaret Wrightson, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, “Progress Made in 
Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain,” Testimony before the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, September 9, 2003, www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1155T. 
17 John Upton, “Coast Guard Has Girded Defense Since 9/11,” San Francisco Chronicle, September 
11, 2008, http://www.john-upton.com/rss/coastguard.htm. 
18 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security, October 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0753.shtm. 
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understanding of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could 
impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United States.”19  
In a Letter of Promulgation establishing the Coast Guard Auxiliary’s separate 
MDA program in 2002, Jeffrey High, the Director of the Coast Guard MDA program, 
wrote that the Coast Guard published its Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security20 to 
established key objectives and means to achieve them, in order to mitigate the risks 
associated with threats to the nation’s maritime security and to prevent terrorist attacks. 
There are three primary components of this strategy:  Awareness of threats and 
vulnerabilities; Prevention and Protection against threats; and Response to potential 
attacks.  The then Director of the Coast Guard’s MDA program observed “among these 
elements the most important is Awareness, because the success of the other two elements 
clearly depends on the effectiveness of the first . . . the ability to know what is both 
normal and abnormal . . . is crucial to our Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security.”21 
Despite all the increased maritime security and MDA activities, until release of 
the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Small Vessel Security Strategy in April 
2008,22 little was done to develop better awareness of, or to counter, possible terrorist 
activities by small boat operators that were already within U.S. territorial waters,23 even 
though, terror attack by small boats have been identified as one of the highest threats to 
the maritime industry at home and aboard.24 The concerns of the United States Coast  
                                                 
19 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Maritime Domain Awareness, December 2004, 
www.americaswaterwaywatch.org/PDF/MDAwhitepaperv2.0-Feb.%202005.pdf (quoting testimony from 
Mr. Jeffrey High before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Committee, U.S. 
House of Representatives, October 6, 2004). 
20 U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, December 2002, 
www.uscg.mil/news/reportsandbudget/maritime_strategy/USCG/_maritime_strategy.pdf. 
21 Jeffrey High, Appendix B; “Letter of Promulgation,” U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Maritime Domain 
Awareness, December 2004, www.americaswaterwaywatch.org/PDF/MDAwhitepaperv2.0-
Feb.%202005.pdf. 
22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Small Vessel Security Strategy,” April 2008, 
www.dhs.gov/xlibary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf. 
23 President, Proclamation, “Territorial Sea of the United States, Proclamation 5928,,” Federal 
Register 54 (January 9, 1989): 777, reprinted at 103 Stat. 2981, 3 C.F.R. 547 (1989). 
24 Christopher Doane and Joseph DiRenzo III, “Small Vessel Security Summit Initiates Constructive 
Dialogue,” Maritime & Border Security News, July 25, 2007. 
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Guard and the maritime industry’s regarding the small boat threat, reflect the well-
publicized small boat attacks by al-Qa’ida against the USS Cole in October of 2000 (see 
Figures 1 and 2),25 the French M/V Limburg in October 2002 (see Figure 3),26 and the 
November 26, 2008, terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, where the terrorists came ashore 
via small boats.27 
A. THREAT VERSUS VULNERABILITY TO THE SMALL BOAT ATTACK 
The current Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, 
emphasized the importance of addressing the small boat threat by stating that “the 
rippling economic ramifications of a small vessel attack against a high-value target such 
as a container vessel, cruise ship, or petro-chemical facility elevate the problem from a 
national level to cause for global concern.”28  He further stated that to mitigate the danger 
from small boats, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, including the Coast 
Guard, need greater MDA, appropriate legal regimes, and partnerships across the public 
and private sector.29  This sentiment was echoed by a Maine law enforcement official 
when he stated “when that oil tanker is coming from the Middle East, we know 
everything about it before it get here, but when it comes to small boats, nobody knows a 
lot about them.”30  
                                                 
25 Robert Perl and Ronald O’Rourke, “Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for 
Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, January 30, 2001. 
26 “Strait of Hormuz: Assessing Threats to Energy Security in the Persian Gulf” The Robert S. Strauss 
Center for International Security and Law, 2007, www.hormuz.robertstrausscenter.org/boats#relevant. “In 
October 2002, a suicide small boat attacked the M/V Limburg, a French-flagged VLCC supertanker, off of 
the port of Ash Shihr, southeast of Sana'a, Yemen. The detonation of the suicide boat, which analysts 
estimate was a fifteen-foot fiberglass boat, blew a 36- by 26-foot hole through both hulls of the double-
hulled tanker, resulting in an intense fire and the eventual loss of over 50,000 barrels of oil.”  
27 Spencer S. Hsu, “Chertoff Urges Tighter Security: Citing Mumbai, He Talks of Coastal Measures 
and Other Moves,” Washington Post, December 4, 2008. 
28 Thad Allen, “Friend or Foe? Tough to Tell,” U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings 134, 1 (October 
2008). 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Homeland Security to Unveil Plan to Guard against Small Boat Attacks,” Associated Press, April 
27, 2008, quoting John Fetterman, Chief of Maine’s Marine Patrol, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,352790,00.html. 
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However, despite the frequent use of the word “threat” by many parties when 
addressing the possibility of the small boat attack, there is little direct intelligence that a 
small boat attack is imminent in U.S. waters. According to an April 23, 2008, intelligence 
assessment obtained by The Associated Press, while the use of a small boat as a weapon 
is likely to remain al-Qa’ida's weapon of choice and main threat in the maritime 
environment given its ease in arming and deploying, low cost, and record of success 
overseas. “There is no intelligence right now that there's a credible risk” of this type of 
attack in U.S. waters, Admiral Allen says. “But the vulnerability is there.”31 
 
 
Figure 1.   Damage to USS Cole Following Small Boat Attack32 
                                                 
31 Mike Fornes, “Boaters Asked to Watch for Terror Threats,” Cheboygan Tribune, May 1, 2008, 
http://webapps.mlca.uscg.mil/LantareaNews/PrintVersion.cfm?NewsID=28868. 
32 Strauss, “Straits of Hormuz.” 
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Figure 2.   Additional View of Damage to USS Cole33 
 
Figure 3.   Aftermath of Attack on M/V Limburg34 
                                                 
33 MSNBC Media Stock Photo, 
http://msnbcmedia3.msn.com/j/msnbc/Components/Photos/070314/070314_USS_cole_hlarge_1p.hlarge.jpg. 
34 Strauss, “Strait of Hormuz.”  
  8
The possible threats and vulnerabilities posed by small boat attack is personal to 
all Coastguardsmen, not only because of daily interaction with the boating public, but 
also because a small boat loaded with explosives killed a Coastguardsman off the coast of 
Iraq in April 2004.  Petty Officer Nathan Bruckenthal was on a patrol boat approaching a 
small Middle-Eastern doja-type vessel, when its crew deliberately detonated the cargo of 
explosives meant to destroy an oil terminal. Petty Officer Bruckenthal died in the attack, 
making him the first Coastguardsman killed in combat since the Vietnam War.35  
Analysts believe that attacks by small boats are the most likely means of maritime 
attack against the U.S. because they “satisfy the overwhelming terrorist requirement for 
simplicity.”36 Other experts have begun to suggest that, as the world becomes better 
prepared for terrorist attacks on land, “threat displacement” effects could occur, resulting 
in an overall increased amount of maritime terrorism over the next few years.37  Admiral 
Allen is also reported as stating, after reviewing a 2006 threat assessment, that there is a 
significant threat posed by vessel-borne improvised explosive devices, and that the 
vulnerability to small boat attack “stood out” in the assessment.38  Similarly, in October 
2007, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said that he had ordered agency 
leaders to ‘raise the [nation’s] protection level with respect to small boats.”39 After the 
2008 Mumbai terror attacks, Secretary Chertoff said “The November 26 terrorist attacks 
on Mumbai underscore the need for U.S. authorities to counter the security threat posed 
by small boats, strengthen the Coast Guard, and keep the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency within the Department of Homeland Security.”40 
                                                 
35 Department of Defense News Release No. 370-04, April 26, 2004, 
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/nbbruckenthal.htm. 
36 Paul W. Parfomak and John Frittelli, “Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection 
Priorities,” CRS Report for Congress, January 9, 2007. 
37 Silvia Ciotti Galletti, “Old and New Threats: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism,” Eurocrime, 2007, 
www.southchinasea.org/docs/Galletti-Piracy,%20Old%20and%20New%20Threats.pdf. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Thomas Frank, “New Terror Threat? Small Boats,” USA Today, October 31, 2007. 
40 Spencer S. Hsu, “Chertoff Urges Tighter Security: Citing Mumbai, He Talks of Coastal Measures 
and Other Moves,” Washington Post, December 4, 2008.” Terrorists apparently approached the coastal 
Indian city in a stolen fishing boat and rubber dinghies. 
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It is important to note that the small boat threat involves more than just a vessel 
loaded with explosives ramming itself into a large vessel or facility. Small boats could 
also be used to carry terrorists across the U.S.’s maritime border as were the Islamic 
terrorists that attacked Mumbai.41  Small boats could also be used as platforms for 
terrorists using shoulder-fired “stinger-type” weapons against other ships or at 
commercial aircraft passing overhead.42 Significantly, many large airports are adjacent to 
large bodies of water with easy close access to boaters, including Boston, New York 
City, Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Oakland International Airports in 
California.   
Furthermore, al-Qa’ida has considered using sea mines to hinder traffic in vessel 
chokepoints,43 and in 2004, the Abu Sayyaf terror group in the Philippines placed a bomb 
on a passenger ferry that ultimately resulted in over 100 deaths and the capsized the 
vessel.44  Finally, important critical infrastructures, including numerous chemical and 
petroleum processing plants, also lie along U.S. shores and in U.S. ports, providing easy 
access for small boat terrorists.45 
The U.S. Coast Guard, as the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security, 
is tasked with conducting operations in support of the nation’s Ports Waterways and 
Coastal Security (PWCS) mission as outlined in the Coast Guard Law Enforcement 
Manual.  PWCS refers to [maritime] anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism activities, 
including support to Military Outloads (MOLs).  The Coast Guard’s PWCS program is 
                                                 
41 Hsu, “Chertoff Urges Tighter Security: Citing Mumbai, He Talks of Coastal Measures and Other 
Moves.” 
42 John Kifner, “Missiles are Called Threat to Civil Aviation,” New York Times, November 4, 2007. 
43 Akiva Lorenz, “Al-Qa’ida’s Maritime Threat,” International Institute for Counterterrorism, April 
15, 2007, http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/2007/04/15/al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-maritime-threat. 
44 Catherine Zara Raymond, “How Real is the Threat from Maritime Terrorism?” Power and Interest 
News Report, December 12, 2005, 
www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=410&language_id=1. 
45 Department of Homeland Security, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan,” 2006, 1, 
www.dhs.gov/nipp. “The overarching goal of the NIPP is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient 
America by enhancing protection of the Nation’s critical infrastructures/key resources (CI/KR) to prevent, 
deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts of terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit 
them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, 
natural disaster or other emergency.” 
  10
responsible for protecting the U. S. maritime domain and maritime transportation system 
- by preventing terrorist attacks, sabotage, espionage, or subversive acts and responding 
to and aiding in the recovery from attacks that might occur.46   
An important part of this mission is to protect the maritime border from 
incursions by terrorists via maritime means.  The threat of the U.S. maritime border being 
crossed by terrorists and criminals was outlined in 2001 by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, a 
former Mexican national security advisor and ambassador to the United Nations, when he 
warned the United States that Spanish and Islamic terrorist groups were using Mexico as 
a refuge.47  General James T. Hill, the former commander of the U.S. Southern 
Command, stated that the U.S. faces a growing risk from terrorists groups relocating to 
Latin America, and specifically warned that Hezbollah and groups like it had established 
bases in Latin America; these concerns were exacerbated by Venezuela’s support to 
radical Islamic groups.48 
The DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) noted that one of the ways the 
United States could counter this already clearly-identified threat was to become more 
aware of what is and is not normal activity in the local maritime realm.  As Director High 
noted above, “awareness is the most important part of the nations’ maritime strategy.” 
Who would be better to know what is normal and what is not normal in the local 
maritime environment than the operators and passengers onboard the more than 17 
million small vessels that operate on U.S. waterways on a regular basis?    
America’s boaters, and international boaters arriving across our maritime borders 
with Mexico and Canada and the Caribbean, operate along all the coastlines of the United 
States and are often the only eyes on the waters for miles. By contrast, U.S. Coast Guard 
assets are primarily concentrated in the vicinity of large ports, and the Coast Guard’s 
primary search and rescue and law enforcement assets - the Search and Rescue small boat 
                                                 
46 Program Assessment, Coast Guard: Ports Waterways and Coastal Security, 2006, 
http://www.etrunk.kiev.ua/omb/expectmore/summary/10003635.2006.html. 
47 Bert Tussing, “New Requirements for a New Challenge: The Military’s Role in Border Security,” 
Homeland Security Affairs IV, no. 3 (2008), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.3.4. 
48 Ibid. 
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stations - are only scattered along the coasts, sometimes as far as 100 miles apart.49 This 
configuration means there are significant areas of coastline that are only regularly seen by 
the boating public and local law enforcement agency vessels.  Therefore, the boat 
operators, the boating public, local cities and state, federal, and tribal agencies along the 
coasts must be a part of any truly successful anti-small boat threat MDA awareness 
program, as   
The Coast Guard’s leadership role in addressing current and emerging 
transnational maritime security threats will require seamless C4ISR 
[command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance] connectivity no only with its own operating forces, 
but with the myriad of governmental agencies and nations allied with the 
United States in confronting those threats.50 
The above-identified small boat threat then raises the following questions: how 
are these millions of persons, the commercial industries that support them, and other 
federal, state and local agencies incorporated into the Coast Guards’ and the nation’s 
MDA program? What activities, tactics, technologies, etc., can the Coast Guard and its 
partner agencies take to better address this threat with their limited assets? The National 
Plan to Achieve MDA attempts to address this issue of using civilians in MDA by calling 
for programs to be developed to “encourage members of the maritime industry and 
recreational boating community to report suspicious activities,”51 but little in the way of 
actual results followed.   
The SVSS does lay out four specific goals to enhance security against the small 
boat threat: (1) getting the boating public more involved in the nation’s MDA programs, 
including increasing awareness of the Coast Guard’s America’s Waterway Watch 
(AWW) program; (2) requiring the use of risk-based decision making to target the 
highest risk small boats; (3) leveraging technology to increase surveillance/detection  
 
                                                 
49 For example, there are over 200 miles between the Coast Guard Station in Bodega Bay, CA and the 
Station Humboldt, CA, www.mapquest.com.  
50 Bruce Stubbs and Scott C. Truver, America’s Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and 
Security in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 1999), 107. 
51 DHS, “Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness” Appendix B, 5.  
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along the maritime border and high risk areas; and (4) enhancing the coordination and 
cooperation among federal, state, local and tribal agencies, and the private sector, and 
increasing international coordination with other maritime nations.52 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
How can the Coast Guard and the DHS better use the members of the United 
States’ maritime community as part of the nation’s MDA program to detect and deter the 
small boat attack before it begins, and how can the Coast Guard itself and other local law 
enforcement agencies implement new tactics, procedures and the use of new technology 
to lessen the chance of a successful small boat terror attack in U.S. waters?  This thesis 
will address possible ways to approach these questions and implement the goals of the 
Small Vessel Security Strategy by conducting a review of the current state of worldwide 
maritime terrorism, piracy, and drug smuggling, and then conducting an analysis of the 
threats posed by these small boat-centric regimes to recommend actions and changes in 
maritime security policy.  These recommended changes to policy include increasing the 
human intelligence (HUMINT) gathered from the nation’s maritime community/boating 
public through increased outreach; proposing specific actions to be taken by the Coast 
Guard and other agencies to detect/deter a small boat attack before it begins by 
identifying possible staging areas for such attacks and prioritizing those areas for patrols 
and intelligence gathering based on their risk; identifying those specific technologies 
already available and under development that may be of use in the overall anti-small boat 
terror strategy; finally, this thesis will evaluate what actions, regulations, movement 
restrictions, etc., may become necessary after the first successful attack by small boat 
terrorists in U.S. territorial waters. 
 C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The problem of how to protect maritime shipping against the threat posed by 
small boats already within U.S. territorial waters is only beginning to be addressed by 
                                                 
52 DHS, “Small Vessel Security Strategy.”  
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authors and institutions,53 although there has been an increasing awareness by everyone 
in the maritime community, both governmental and non-governmental, of this threat and 
the possible actions that the Coast Guard and other agencies may take to address it.54 As 
it is almost impossible for the Coast Guard and other agencies to monitor the tens of 
thousands of miles of shorelines, marinas, boat ramps, etc., from which these types of 
attacks could be launched, the Coast Guard as the lead agency for homeland security has 
to find a way to incorporate the millions of boaters on the water every day into its MDA 
program.   
Additionally, new technology must also be included in any small boat awareness 
strategy and vessel/port self-protection program.  There are many different technologies 
available that should be implemented, and the proper placement of monitoring equipment 
that can sense whether a passing small boat carries WMDs, explosives, chemical agents 
or other dangerous cargo, has to be a part of this small boat threat awareness program. 
Very little research has gone into how to better involve the boating public in 
watching for suspicious behavior in the inshore maritime area.  Several Coast Guard 
action plans have been developed to address the waterborne IED threat, but the vast 
majority of the proposed plans deal with increased intelligence activities on the national 
scale, on security cameras, and increased Coast Guard patrols around marinas, boat 
ramps, etc.  While the Coast Guard has implement the America’s Waterway Watch 
program and promoted the SVSS with regional summits, there has been little discussion 
about how to better include the boating public in small boat anti-IED activities, other than 
advising them of the above programs, and what other specific actions, tactics, and 
training the Coast Guard itself or other government agencies can take to lessen the threat. 
                                                 
53 Doane and DiRenzo, “Small Vessel Security Summit.” See also, “DHS sees IEDs as Growing 
Domestic Threat,” HSDailywire.com, October 22, 2007, www.hsdailywire.com/single.php?id=4876. 
54 James Jay Carafano, “Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea,” The 
Heritage Foundation, June 11, 2007, www.heritage.org/research/homelanddefense/bg2041.cfm. 
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In addition to efforts such as the small boat summits noted above and several 
recent statements by Admiral Allen,55 the Coast Guard has begun discussing how to 
specifically address this threat, including possibly changing some policies to address the 
small boat threat because of its increased risk.56  Several authors have discussed 
improving the Coast Guard MDA through improving intelligence-gathering efforts, but 
again, the authors have mainly ignored the possible Human Intelligence (HUMINT) that 
could be gathered if the boating public was widely included.   
The major subcategories of the literature in this area include Coast Guard policies 
relating to improving in-shore HUMINT gathering and their strengths and weaknesses; 
Coast Guard policies relating to the small boat threat; general Coast Guard Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA) programs; U.S. Navy/Marine policies on small boat threats 
and force protection; literature on previous waterborne threats; and literature on types of 
WMD that can be carried into the United States via maritime means, and the technology 
to detect the various threats.  
1. Near/In Shore HUMINT Gathering Issues 
In R.B. Watt’s Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis entitled “Implementing 
Maritime Domain Awareness,”57 the author stated that MDA is really nothing more than 
intelligence.  However, he mainly addressed how increased MDA intelligence could 
support members of the Coast Guard and Navy by fusing their interagency data at the 
highest agency level.  Watt offered little discussion related to improving MDA 
intelligence gathering in the near shore environment.  Similarly, Christopher McDaniel 




                                                 
55 Admiral Thad Allen, “State of the Coast Guard” speech, February 13, 2007, 
http://www.uscg.mil/comdt/speeches/socg2007.asp. “We’re beginning to discuss what we need to do to 
address regimes regarding recreational vessels, uninspected tug and barges, and small passenger vessels.” 
56 Jeffrey Wheeler, “Risk-Based Mission Activity Analysis Process; Coast Guard Proceedings 64, no. 
3 (2007): 28. 
57 R.B. Watts, “Implementing Domain Awareness,” Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006. 
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again concentrated on how to better track and board large vessels that were coming to the 
United States, rather than on the vessels that were already present in U.S. territorial 
waters.58 
Another NPS thesis by Michael Billeaudeaux dealt with how the United States 
has involved the local maritime community in assisting the Coast Guard in its activities,59 
but it focused on non-boating members of the maritime community.  This thesis 
concentrated on how the Citizens Action Network (CAN), which operates along the 
shores in the states of Oregon and Washington, can help the Coast Guard by offering the 
assistance of persons living on shore who have a view of the water.  The volunteer 
members of this program, who have homes or businesses with views of the water, agree 
to keep an eye out on the water, and to be available to receive calls from the Coast Guard 
to view and report on a specifically targeted area when asked.  While the assistance of 
persons living in close proximity to the water and acting as spotters can be beneficial to 
search and rescue/flare sighting-type cases, these spotters cannot see whether a bomb is 
being assembled at a marina or whether “dry runs” are being attempted.  However, 
incorporating live-aboards or harbor masters at marinas into the CAN program could 
significantly improve the HUMINT relating to small boat activities. Importantly, the 
above CAN program is slated to eventually be implemented nationwide.60 
This small boat threat thesis follows up on the recommendations and actions 
included in the CAN program by specifically calling for the improvement of boating 
public participation in MDA/HUMINT activities in U.S. territorial waters, marinas, boat 
ramps, and other maritime community locations such as dive shops, boat sales/rental 
companies, etc.  The Coast Guard has established the beginnings of such a reporting 
organization with the implementation of the AWW program,61 which encourages boaters 
                                                 
58 Christopher McDaniel & Matthew Tardy, “Role-Based Control for Coalition Partners in Maritime 
Domain Awareness,” Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. 
59 Michael Billeaudeaux, “Leveraging Citizens and Cultivating Vigilance for Force Multiplication in 
the Maritime Domain,” Naval Postgraduate School, September 2007. 
60 Billeaudeaux, “Leveraging Citizens and Cultivating Vigilance,” 137. 
61 United States Coast Guard, “America’s Waterways Watch” Program, 2005, 
www.americaswaterwaywatch.org. 
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to report suspicious activities to a central phone number (1-888-24WATCH).  This thesis 
will be to analyze the failures/successes of the AWW program and propose how to make 
it a real part of the Coast Guard anti-small vessel borne improvised explosive devise 
(VBIED) program.  The shortcomings of the current AWW program are self-evident, as 
the vast majority of the boaters present at the Coast Guard’s national Small Vessel 
Security Summit did not even know that AWW existed.62  How can the boating and 
maritime community report suspicious activity if they are unaware that there is a 
procedure for doing so? 
2. MDA Policies/Programs 
The Naval Postgraduate School itself discussed the importance of MDA as part of 
its participation in the Maritime Domain Protection Resource Group.63 As part of its 
project update in 2004, the task force gave a two-part definition of MDA: (1) the timely 
knowledge of position, identity, intent, and history of every element in any area of 
interest operating in or influencing the maritime environment, and (2) actionable 
information pertaining to any threat requiring a response.64  This broad definition, which 
includes the activities and movements of all small vessels, is a vast undertaking beyond 
the scope of the abilities of the Coast Guard in its present form. 
                                                 
62 Statement by LCDR Matthew Wadleigh, who attended the conference on behalf of the Coast 
Guard’s Eleventh District. Also, see John Anthony, “Small Boat Threat,” Boat/US Magazine, May 2007, 
(wherein he asked how do we address the problem of [small boat] security? How about meetings by the 
Coast Guard with various boating groups to lay out the problem and develop solutions?”)  
63 U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Maritime Domain Protection Research Group program . 
http://www.nps.edu/academics/meyerinstitute/MDP/ (The Maritime Domain Protection Research Group - 
formerly known as the Maritime Domain Protection Task Force - was formed to investigate issues 
surrounding protection of the United States, its vessels, and citizens from terrorist threats originating in the 
maritime domain. The goal of the Maritime Domain Protection Research Group (MDP-RG) is to 
coordinate, research and investigate issues involving the DOD’s responsibilities and roles in Homeland 
Defense. Stakeholders include a variety of agencies and offices throughout the United States and several 
international allies. The Research Group will explore methods to define, design, and aid the implementation 
of a national Maritime Domain Protection System to assist in defeating maritime terrorism as early and as 
far from U.S. borders as possible). 
64 U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Maritime Domain Awareness System Demonstration program. 
www.nps.edu/academics/meyerinstitute/MDP/mdp_research_MDA_demo.htm. 
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3. Literature on the Small Boat Attack Threat 
There has been a significant increase in articles and commentaries on the threats 
posed by small vessels over the last several years, especially since the release of the DHS 
SVSS in April 2008,65 which followed input from the maritime community at various 
regional Small Vessel Security Summits.66  Dr.  James Carafano, a prominent member of 
the Heritage Foundation, noted the serious concerns about the small boat threat and 
suggested that there were three possible countermeasures against the small boat attack 
threat in U.S. waters: (1) identification and accreditation, which involves possible new 
regulatory regimes for licensing boat operators and craft, and the possible use of 
transponders on all small craft so their movements can be monitored; (2) improving 
situational awareness by both involving the boating public in a neighborhood watch-type 
program reporting suspicious activities, and the use of technologies to provide 
surveillance and detection of explosive and other materials used by small boat attack 
terrorists, and (3) controlling access and interdicting threats by limiting areas where 
boaters could travel and implementing new measures for stopping a small boat threat 
once it has been identified.67 
The current Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Allen, also recently 
wrote an article in the October 2008 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings, 
wherein he emphasized engaging the maritime community to act as another set of eyes 
and ears on the water to increase the Coast Guard’s MDA, while also stating that small 
vessel security is “an asymmetric threat – a complex problem with multiple variable and 
frames of reference.  We need a fresh perspective to quantify our vulnerabilities and 
reduce the risks that small vessels may pose to our maritime security.”68 
                                                 
65 DHS “Small Vessel Security Strategy.”  
66 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Small Vessel Security Summit” June 19 and 20, 
2008, in Washington, D.C. www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1175627911698.shtm. The summit 
resulted in the Report on the DHS National Small Vessel Security Summit 
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small_vessel_NSVSS_Report_HQ_508.pdf and was followed by several 
regional summits in Long Beach, California, Houston, Texas and other locations.  
67 Carafano, “Small Boats, Big Worries.” 
68 Allen, “Friend or Foe?” 18. 
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There are several articles on the current state of the terrorism threat in the 
maritime environment, with some concentrating on the small boat threat, including the 
threats specifically posed by al-Qa’ida.69 In a recent report in National Defense 
Magazine, Breanne Wagner noted the security gap posed by small boats, including the 
possible use of small boats to carry in weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) from 
adjacent countries, to attack shipping as in the USS Cole scenario, and possibly to 
provide an offshore platform for firing a missile.70  Admiral Allen also addressed the 
possible trafficking of WMDs into the United States via small boats, stating that “a small 
vessel attack can range from a simple improvised explosive device to a weapon of mass 
destruction. A WMD would have obvious catastrophic implications but even a garage-
built bomb or a small-arms attack could force a port to shut down and have long term 
economic and security consequences.”71 
In the Power and Interest News Report,72 the author states that the best way to 
stop maritime terrorists is to disrupt their land capabilities that enable them to take to the 
sea:  
Effective surveillance and intelligence gathering and sharing, will help to 
prevent the acquisition of weapons and explosives by militant groups 
intending to carry out attacks in the maritime domain. A large-scale attack 
on a target at sea requires a considerable amount of planning, training, and 
technology.  The disruption of this process will severely degrade a group’s 
ability to carry out a large scale maritime organization.73   
 
 
                                                 
69 Lorenz, “Al-Qaeda’s Maritime Threat.” identifying the planning cycle necessary for the 
accomplishment of a successful small boat terror attack, and the global maritime security weaknesses in 
this area; See also, Thomas Frank, “New Terror Threat? Small Boats,” USA Today, October 31, 2007.  
70 Breanne Wagner, “Government Lacks Clear Plans to ID Small Vessels Used as Weapons,” National 
Defense Magazine, November 2007, 
www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2007/November/Pages/Gov2444.Lacks2444.aspx. 
71 Allen, “Friend or Foe?” 17. 
72 Raymond, “How Real is the Threat.” 
73 Ibid. 
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Such reasoning is the basis for this author’s proposal to increase the use of boaters and 
technology to counter the small boat threat through increased detection efforts, along 
with the additional patrols and activities outlined under Operation Focused Lens in 
Chapter VIII. 
Among tactics proposed to mitigate the small vessel attack threat are increased 
restricted areas/security zones around vessels, escorting of all vessels that could be 
terrorist targets, radar or transponder monitoring of all small vessel movements, and 
increasing licensing and other regulatory requirements for all small vessel operators.74  
These four possible measures have not been thoroughly addressed by present 
literature, although there is much available discussion of the threat itself by numerous 
authors and publications; they will be some of the main proposals of this thesis.   
As noted above, there is little literature pertaining to way to improve the boating 
public’s reporting of suspicious activities.  However, Homeland Security Secretary 
Chertoff did discuss the importance of using the nation’s boating public to confront 
terrorism by telling them “we recognize that you are a very powerful asset, because you 
are our eyes and ears upon the water. Millions of eyes and ears that give us visibility and 
situational awareness about potential threats, threats that, by the way, would directly 
affect your livelihood as well as the welfare of this country.”75  
4.   Literature on the Neighborhood Watch and Similar Programs 
There is significant literature on the success of the neighborhood watch programs, 
and this thesis will tailor many of the concepts of these programs to apply to the maritime 
domain.76  Specifically, the purpose of neighborhood watch programs is to use citizen 
                                                 
74 Buky, “Maritime Terrorism: The Threat from Small Vessels,” 7-9. 
75 “Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at the Department of Homeland 
Security National Small Vessel Security Summit, June 19, 2007, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1184599844214.shtm. 
76 National Sheriffs’ Association, “Celebrating the Success of 35 Years of the Neighborhood Watch,” 
USAonWatch.org, October 16, 2007, 
www.usaonwatch.org/EZine/EZineMainArticle.php?EZineID=20071101. 
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volunteers to prevent crime in their neighborhoods.77 Additionally, there have been 
numerous calls for more involvement in homeland security at the local level.  The 
International Association of Chiefs of Police stated that all terrorism is local, and that if 
state, tribal and local law enforcement agencies are adequately trained and equipped, they 
can be an invaluable asset in efforts to identify and apprehend suspected terrorists before 
they strike.78 
5.  Literature on Anti-WMD and Small Boat Detection Technologies 
Literature on the possible technologies that could be used as partners to the 
increased vigilance and reporting by the boating public is vast and growing.  The Navy 
has developed the Surface Warfare Mission Package, which is a self-contained set of 
remote sensors and precision attack weapons designed to combat small boat terrorist 
threats to the fleet.79  There are also many private industry products that should be 
evaluated for their use in contravening the small boat attack threat, including the use of 
buoys to mark off secure areas and small craft intrusion barriers that prevent small boats 
from gaining close access to targets.80  The U.S. Navy is also exploring the increased use 
of simulators to counteract the small boat threat.81  Even more interesting, the Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and the Coast Guard are experimenting with buoys 
that have sensors on them that can “sniff” if a passing small vessel has explosives or 
radiological material on board.82 
                                                 
77 National Crime Prevention Council, “Strategy: Citizen Volunteers to Prevent Crime,” 
www.ncpc.org/topics/preparedness/strategies/strategy-citizen-volunteers-to-prevent-crime. 
78 Gene Voegtlin, “From Hometown Security to Homeland Security: IACP’s Principles for a Locally 
Designed and Nationally Coordinated Homeland Security Strategy,” International Association of Chiefs of 
Police White Paper, July 27, 2005, 
http://www.theiacp.org/PublicationsGuides/TopicalIndex/tabid/216/Default.aspx?id=624&v=1. 
79 Naval Sea Command, “SUW Mission Package Attacks Small Boat Threat for LCS,” U.S. Navy.mil, 
September 25, 2007, www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31482. 
80 Whisperwave, “Maritime Homeland Defense & Force Protection Port Security Solutions,” 
www.whisprwave.com/port.htm. 
81 David J. Walton, “Modeling Force Response to Small Boat Attack Against High Value Commercial 
Ships,” Proceedings of the 2005 Winter Simulation Conference, www.informs-
sim.org/wsc05papers/117.pdf. 
82 U.S. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, “DHS Announces West Coast Maritime Radiation 
Detection Project,” September 5, 2007, www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1189012515699.shtm.  
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Finally, the possible solution of limiting the free movement of vessels and/or 
requiring the imposition of transponder-like equipment on board small vessels has been 
discussed in various legal cases.83  The requirement for the AIS upon larger vessels that 
was imposed by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and 200484 and the 
resultant freedom of movement and privacy concerns were addressed in several law 
review articles that will be used in this thesis.85  The June 2007 National Small Vessel 
Security Summit also discussed the possible new regulatory requirements for boat 
operators and the possible use of transponders for small boats;86 the proposed draft 
regulations and requirements for the AIS transponders are available on the Coast Guard 
website.87 
D.   THESIS OUTLINE/PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis began in Chapter I by discussing the current situation concerning the 
United States’ general response to the overall maritime terrorism threat since 9/11 and the 
specific threats and vulnerabilities relating to the small boat terror threat in U.S. waters.  
Chapter II outlines the general international maritime threat, including responses by the 
United Nations and the International Maritime Organization to those threats, while 
Chapter III reviews individual national responses to maritime terrorism and the small 
                                                 
83 United States Supreme Court, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The U.S. Supreme Court stated 
“The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of 
law under the Fifth Amendment. If that “liberty” is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making 
functions of the Congress. . . . . Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside 
frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, . . . may be as 
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement 
is basic in our scheme of values.” 
84 Title 46 U.S. Code Section 70111(a)(2)(A)), 2006 ed., and Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations, 
Part 103.300-310, 2006 ed. 
85 “The Red and Green Lights of Maritime Homeland Security” 2004 U.S. – Mexico Law Journal, 12 
U.S.-Mex. LJ 89, and “Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of Maritime 
Terrorism,” 2002 Washington College of Law, American University Int’l Law Review, 19 Am. U. Int’l Rev 
341, and “The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at 
Sea, 2005 Harvard Int’l Law Journal, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 131; Richard Farrell, “Maritime Terrorism: 
Focusing on the Probable,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2007. 
86 Christopher Doane and Joseph DiRenzo III, “Small Vessel Security Summit Initiates Constructive 
Dialogue” Maritime & Border Security News, July 25, 2007. 
87 U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center, “What is the Automatic Identification System (AIS)? 
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/enav/ais/default.htm. 
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boat threat, and the recommendations and lessons learned that the United States can take 
from the responses of other nations.  Chapter IV emphasizes the need to use risk based 
decision-making when implementing any maritime and small boat security strategies. 
Chapter V discusses the how the United States’ war on drugs, specifically its 
interdiction and presence activities off the Central and South American coasts, should be 
continued due to its possible impact in preventing new small boat terror threats like self-
propelled semi-submersibles used by drug smugglers, from approaching the United States 
from afar.  Chapter VI will review the recent increases in successful international 
maritime piracy attacks and how this success may embolden terrorists to increase their 
use of maritime small boats to accomplish their terroristic goals in the future. 
Chapter VII recommends changes to the nation’s MDA activities by calling for 
greater inclusion of the boating public as the Coast Guard’s eyes and ears on the water to 
report suspicious activities.  Chapter VIII makes specific recommendations for new 
nationwide tactics and intelligence efforts led by the Coast Guard, with participation by 
federal/state/local agencies, private citizens and industry, to specifically detect and deter 
the possible small boat attack before it begins.  Chapter IX emphasizes the need to 
include the most up-to-date technology in any plan to detect/prevent a small boat attack, 
including reviewing technologies for self help by vessels and future detection 
technologies in development.  Chapter X outlines possible small boat owner 
repercussions and freedom of movement restrictions that the United States and the Coast 
Guard may implement after the first successful small boat attack in U.S. waters.  Chapter 
XI concludes by emphasizing the reality of the small boat threat, and how the 
recommendations in Chapters VII through IX can and should be implemented to lessen 
the chances of a successful small boat attack in U.S. waters. 
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II.  BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
TERRORISM 
In a report published in the New York Times a year after 9/11, the authors 
discussed a federal report that focused heavily on the vulnerability of America's seaports, 
asserting that the intensive efforts to improve airport and air cargo security in the wake of 
the 9/11 attacks overshadowed the potential for attacks through shipping containers, boats 
and container trucks.  Ninety-five percent of the trade from outside North America to the 
United States moves by sea. A catastrophic attack at one port could shut down American 
trade and cripple a large portion of the nation's economy, it concludes. The article notes 
that ''If an explosive device was loaded in a container and set off in a port, it would 
almost automatically raise concern about the integrity of the 21,000 containers that arrive 
in U.S. ports each day . . . and a three- to four-week closure of U.S. ports would bring the 
global container industry to its knees.''88 
Although the container threat issue has been a main concern of Congress for the 
last several years, it is clear that the vulnerability of the United States and other maritime 
nations does not just come from the container threat.89  In fact, the threat posed by 
21,000+ containers arriving in U.S. ports seems minor when compared to the threat posed 
by the 17 million+ recreational vessels freely operating in U.S. waters on a daily basis.90   
 
 
                                                 
88 James Dao, “Threats and Reponses, Gaps in Security: Report Finds U.S. Unprepared for Next 
Terror Attack,” New York Times, October 25, 2002. 
89 Michael Chertoff, Statement before the National Small Vessel Security Summit, June 19, 2007, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1184599844214.shtm. “I have to tell you that if all we do is 
worry about containers, it’s as if we’re locking the front door and we’re kicking the back door wide open. 
Because there’s also a concern that we have that someone might seek to smuggle a weapon of mass 
destruction into a seaport, not using a container, but using a commercial vessel, including a vessel that is 
below 300 gross tons.” 
90 Ben Iannotta, “17 Million Potential Bombs,” C4ISR Journal, 3 (2008), 
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A vessel itself being used as a weapon was identified as one of the methods that 
may be used by terrorists in the DHS-FBI joint publication “Potential Terrorist Attack 
Methods; Joint Special Assessment” dated April 23, 2008.91  In their description of this 
threat, the DHS and FBI identified two means of a maritime vessel attack: a vessel loaded 
with explosives and used as a weapon, and the vessel itself as a weapon (kinetic attack).92  
While these two types of attacks were identified as the two “primary means” of maritime 
terrorist attack in the DHS-FBI joint assessment, other attack methods have also been 
identified, including a stand off attack using a rocket propelled grenade type weapon 
from another nearby vessel or from shore, and internal sabotage, which could cause a 
vessel to sink in and block a busy ship channel or explode and cause damage to adjacent 
vessels, the port, or population centers. 
As noted above, the threat posed by maritime terrorism is not solely a U.S. 
interest.  Shortly after 9/11, the international community, through the United Nation’s 
International Maritime Organization, convened to determine how the international 
maritime community of nations could cooperate to address this threat.  In November 
2001, IMO’s 22nd Assembly adopted resolution A.924(22) “Review of Measures and 
Procedures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism Which Threaten the Security of Passengers and 
Crews and the Safety of Ships,” which called for a thorough review of all existing 
measures already adopted by IMO to combat acts of violence and crime at sea.93 
The Assembly agreed to hold a diplomatic conference on maritime security in 
December 2002 in order to adopt new regulations that might be deemed necessary to 
enhance ship and port security and prevent shipping from becoming a target of 
international terrorism, and to significantly boost to the Organization’s technical co-
operation program to help developing countries address security issues.  The International  
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Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) and other security measures were 
adopted by that Conference later in December 2002, with their entry into force being set 
for July 1, 2004.94 
The United States adopted and implemented the requirements of the ISPS Code 
when it enacted the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,95 which, among other 
issues, required that all maritime facilities and vessels create and implement security 
plans outlining how they would provide security for their facility and/or vessel.  These 
plans would have to be approved by the U.S. Coast Guard.  Additionally, MTSA 
established Area Maritime Security Committees in each major port;96 these committees 
would be chaired by the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port, with other maritime 
stakeholders in the port also being part of the committee.  Additionally, MTSA and ISPS 
required that larger vessels be equipped with Automatic Identification System equipment 
that would enable countries and other vessels to identify and track these vessels as they 
moved about the world.97 
The stated purpose of the MTSA regulations was identified as being to 
align requirements of domestic maritime security regulations with the 
international maritime security standards in the International Convention 
for Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Chapter XI-2) and the 
International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities, parts A 
and B, adopted on 12 December 2002; to ensure security arrangements are 
as compatible as possible for vessels trading internationally; to emphasize 
cooperation and coordination with local port community stakeholders, 
based on existing domestic standards as well as established industry 
security practices; and requires assessments and plans intended for use in 
implementing security measures at various MARSEC levels.98 
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Because the ISPS Code is part of the Safety at Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, 
the 148 countries that are contracting parties to the Convention are mandated to comply 
with its provisions.  Every major maritime country is a party to the ISPS code.99  
However, although the ISPS Code provided mandatory requirements that all maritime 
countries must follow, each country implemented the ISPS Code based on its own 
internal lawmaking mechanisms, and countries were free to be more restrictive and to 
legislate maritime security areas not specifically covered by the ISPS Code. 
The differing approaches to maritime security taken by several different countries 
and organizations may be of educational value to the United States and other countries.  
Additionally, DHS and the U.S. Coast Guard have recently begun to examine how the 
U.S. might better address the threats posed to maritime interests by small boat attacks,100 
such as occurred against the USS Cole and the M/V Limburg, and what can be learned 
from the ways that other countries have addressed the threats posed by small boat attacks 
in their territorial waters. 
Historically, the world’s oceans have not been a major venue for terrorist activity. 
According to the RAND Corporation’s terrorism database, maritime terrorist attacks have 
accounted for only two percent of all incidents since 1969.101  The reason for their 
limited use may be that “the sophistication, expense, and training to carry out maritime 
terrorism necessitates considerable overhead. It requires terrorist organizations to acquire 
appropriate vessels, mariner skills and, specialist weapons/explosive capabilities.”102 
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However, limited the numbers for maritime terrorism may be historically, the 
economic impact and/or threat to human life that could result from a terrorist act in a port 
would be significant.  For example, should a terrorist attack in the port of Los 
Angeles/Long Beach cause the port to be shut down even for only a few days, the 
economic impact would be in the billions of dollars.103  The economic impact of any 
disruption in U.S. ports will only increase in the future as the ports continue to grow in 
size and cargo capacity and as the overall U.S. international trade volume continues to 
grow. 
Additionally, imagine the impact to the U.S. and world cruise line industry should 
a cruise ship be attacked via a small boat explosive attack.  Terrorists could also bring the 
$30 billion U.S. recreational boating economy to a halt by one small boat attack, or even 
by simply making a legitimate small boat threat; the U.S. government would probably 
have no choice but to order all small boats to stay in port while the security issues were 
evaluated.104 
Several well known terrorist groups have a maritime terror capability, including 
al-Qa’ida, Hezbollah, LTTE, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).105  Al-Qa’ida as an 
organization has shown that it considers maritime terrorism a valid means for attacking 
the west.  Al-Qa’ida’s first successful attack was against the USS Cole on October 12, 
2000, in the port of Aden, Yemen. Two suicide bombers loaded a small boat with 270 
kilograms of C4 explosive, pulled alongside the Cole during its refueling operations and 
exploded the vessel.  Seventeen sailors were killed, 37 were injured, and over $250 
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example shows that al-Qa’ida can, with relatively little funding ($40,000), cause damage 
in the hundreds of millions of dollars and effectively take a warship out of the fleet for 
over a year.106 
The mastermind of maritime terrorist operations for al-Qa’ida was Abdul al-
Rahim al-Nashiri, otherwise known as the “Prince of the Sea.”107  According to Michael 
Richardson, a visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Southeast Asian 
Studies, al-Nashiri based his operation on four pillars: (1) using a zodiac speed boat 
packed with explosives to ram a ship; (2) using medium sized boat as bombs to be blown 
up near slips or ports; (3) using airplanes to ram boats; and (4) having underwater 
demolition teams.  Before he was captured, al-Nashiri planned to attack U.S. warships in 
the Straits of Hormuz and Gibraltar with small boats, to bomb the Navy’s 5th Fleet 
headquarters in Bahrain, and to fly a small aircraft into a vessel moored in a United Arab 
Emirates port.108  During interrogation, al-Nashiri revealed that, if warships became too 
difficult to approach, tourist ships could be targeted.109 A dossier captured with al-
Nashiri listed cruise ships sailing from western ports among “targets of opportunity,” 
indicating that mega-cruise ships exceeding 140,000 gross tons and carrying over 5000 
passengers and crew were desirable targets for terrorists.110   
The Islamist extremist suicide terrorist, whether by land or by sea, has little 
concern for the fact that he will be committing suicide, which is normally strictly 
condemned in Islam.  Radical Islamic imams have clearly stated that killing oneself in the 
benefit of Islam is different from normal suicide in that “he who commits suicide kills 
himself for his own benefit, but he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the 
sake of his religion and his nation . . . the Mujahid is full of hope.”  Like the Japanese 
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Kamikaze who described their impending deaths as “cherry petals that fall before bearing 
fruit, so too, for the Palestinian shaheed (martyr): they are youth at the peak of their 
blooming, who at a certain moment decide to turn their body into body parts . . . 
flowers.”111 
The threat of small boat attack against U.S. naval and other assets continues to be 
a major and growing worry today. Early in 2008, the M/V Global Patriot, a vessel under 
short term charter to the Military Sealift Command and the U.S. Navy, fired on a small 
boat that approached too close to the vessel as it was passing through the Suez Canal, 
killing at least one of the Egyptian men on board.112  Although the small boat was 
presumably just trying to get close to the vessel to sell some goods, U.S. naval vessels 
cannot take chances after the USS Cole incident. One thing that the attack on the Cole 
showed was that the small boat was an effective weapon against much more powerful 
adversaries.  As noted below, several other terrorist groups have taken that knowledge to 
heart, especially the Tamil Sea Tigers of Sri Lanka,113 although they were an active 
maritime terrorist organization before the rise of al-Qa’ida. 
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III. OTHER NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO 
MARITIME TERROR 
A.   ISRAEL 
Israel has unfortunately accumulated a vast amount of experience in combating 
maritime terrorism.  Over the past decades, according to a senior Israeli naval officer, 
Israel has detected more than eighty maritime terror plots.114  While most of these attacks 
were detected and deterred, some were successful, including an incident in 1974, when 
Palestinian terrorists sailed a vessel onto a beach in Naharia and then killed four and 
injured eight Israelis before being killed by Israeli security forces, and another attack in 
Naharia in 1979, where Palestinian Liberation Front terrorists landed on the beach using a 
rubber boat, and killed a policeman and three members of an Israeli family in an 
apartment there.  The Fatah Palestinian group was involved in an operation where a small 
but fast dinghy vessel was launched from a mother ship outside Israeli waters in 1975. 
Eight terrorists came ashore on a Tel Aviv beach, attacked the Savoy hotel and took 
thirteen hostages.  Eventually, after a siege by Israeli commandos, seven of the terrorists, 
eight of the hostages and three policemen were killed.  A similar event in 1978 called the 
Coastal Road attack resulted in the deaths of thirty-seven Israelis.115 
The first suicide maritime attack came in 1988 when a member of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine steered a fishing vessel loaded with explosives near 
an Israeli naval vessel and detonated it, but no damage was done to the Israeli vessel.  In 
an attempted terrorist delivery effort in 1990, six speed boats were sent towards Israel 
from a Libyan mother ship; one sank, two broke down, one turned back, one was 
captured by the Israeli Navy, while the other made it to shore only to have all the 
terrorists immediately captured. In 2002, another fishing vessel suicide attack from the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad group resulted in some damage and four injuries to the crew of  
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the Israeli Navy vessel Daboor.  A Hamas-sponsored suicide rafter case occurred in 2003 
against the same naval vessel Daboor - only the suicide bomber was killed; there were no 
other injuries or damage.116 
In response to the maritime threat, Israel developed a comprehensive coastal 
defense system using both military and civilian aspects, wherein the public is constantly 
advised to be on the lookout for and report suspicious activities.  The “coastal defense” 
part of the comprehensive system is the responsibility of the Israeli Navy.  This defense 
consists of intelligence gathering, naval patrols outside Israeli territorial seas, coastal 
radar defense shields, the establishment of maritime security areas, and force protection 
programs.117 
Israel uses land-based aerial reconnaissance patrols (Sharaf Maritime Aircraft) 
and Israeli naval patrols to gather intelligence for maritime domain awareness out to 100 
miles from shore.  These patrols, done on an almost constant yet random basis, are the 
outside barrier to Israel’s layered defense system. Closer in towards the Israeli coast, nine 
radar stations scanning out to thirty-two nautical miles give a picture of all maritime 
vessel movements; this system has the ability to detect rubber boats out to ten miles.  
Regional command centers can direct eleven coastal patrol boats to investigate suspicious 
vessels and objects. Closer to shore, Israel has placed floating barriers and fences with 
sensors to deter and detect intruders;118 within Israeli ports and along Israeli beaches are 
extensive CCTV systems that are constantly monitored, and human lookouts are posted 
inside the ports.  Divers are also used to randomly inspect the bottoms of vessels entering 
Israeli waters.119  
Israel’s approach can be described as an increased layered approach to maritime 
terrorism, with each level of maritime security/defense increasing as vessels approach the  
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shore.  The procedures and tactics that Israel uses to maintain maritime domain 
awareness are extensive and effective, and some of them could be used by the United 
States for future planning purposes. 
B.   SINGAPORE/SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The Southeast Asia region, including the countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore and the Philippines, has become a hotbed of maritime piracy and terrorism. It 
is the region most prone to acts of piracy, accounting for around fifty percent of all 
attacks worldwide.  This situation is aggravated by indigenous terrorist groups with 
strong maritime traditions; the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(GAM) and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are all terrorist groups based in Southeast Asia 
with the intention and proven capability to wage maritime terrorism.120 
The International Maritime Bureau reported in 2003 that out of 445 actual and 
attempted pirate attacks on merchant ships, 189 attacks occurred in Southeast Asian 
waters, 121 of them in Indonesian waters, and 35 around Malaysia and Singapore, 
particularly in the congested Straits of Malacca.121 “Because piracy is frequent in 
Southeast Asia, terrorists have found it an attractive cover for maritime terrorism . . . 
[and] terror groups like Al-Qa’ida could also use pirate tactics either to attack ships, or to 
seize ships to use in terror attacks at megaports, much like the September 11 hijackers 
used planes.”122 
Maritime terrorism is Southeast Asia is all the more serious a regional security 
concern because al-Qa’ida and its operatives have a keen awareness of maritime trade 
and understand its significance to the global economy.123  Singapore is very aware of the 
terrorist threat to its port (either the largest or second-largest port in the world by volume 
and traffic), and has implemented a small boat tracking system that goes above and 
beyond the requirements of the ISPS Code.  Singapore now requires that all small vessels 
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have an AIS-like transponder called the Harbor Craft Transponder System (HARTS), that 
sends out a signal identifying the vessel and its position, course and speed to the 
Singapore Maritime and Port Authority.124  Importantly, the government pays for the 
equipment and its installation on all small vessels, which significantly increased the 
recreational boating public’s support of the program.125 
The Philippines has begun to address the maritime terrorism problem there by 
identifying the need to strengthen the intelligence capability of law enforcement agencies 
in the Philippines, noting that “a sound intelligence system is a vital part of any 
counterterrorism strategy, whether land-based or maritime, as a source of information on 
the nature of terror groups, the threat they represent, and their intentions, capabilities, and 
opportunities.”126  Accurate and reliable intelligence may, in fact, be the most effective 
weapon against terrorism, enabling operational agencies and law enforcement authorities 
to develop measures to detect a terrorist threat at the planning and preparation phases.127 
The Philippines has come to the conclusion that while intelligence and military 
might are important parts of the counterterrorism effort, the government must also take a 
holistic approach by beginning to address the root causes of the terrorism also.128 
In a article published in the Asia Times, Eric Koo discussed the threat that 
terrorism and piracy posed to the Malacca Strait and its bordering countries, and how 
those countries are currently working against this threat.129 In July 2004, the three 
countries bordering the Malacca Straits, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, began 
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coordinated naval patrols of the straits to counteract the maritime terrorist and piracy 
threats. In Part 3 of Koo’s article relating to strategies for maritime security in the region, 
he suggested that smaller and faster gun-boats should be used in this effort rather than the 
larger Naval vessels currently being used, and that helicopters should be an integral part 
of these vessels’ operations.130 
Further, the author suggested that political measures need to be taken at the 
highest levels between these three countries to provide a groundwork for understanding 
that anti-piracy and terrorist operations at sea will sometimes involve the inevitable 
intrusion into one or the other country’s territorial waters.131  Importantly, however, the 
author notes that naval firepower is not the final answer, as the best solution would 
involve locating and disrupting the terrorists’/pirates’ planning and operations before they 
take to the water.  There are numerous islets and hidden alcoves throughout this area that 
give hidden shelter to the terrorists, and the best way to attack this threat is through an 
effective and efficient intelligence and security network between these nations that would 
locate and/or deter the staging areas of these operations before they ever begin.  
C.   FRANCE 
After the recent hijacking of the yacht Le Ponant by small boat-borne pirates off 
of the coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden, the French government sought changes 
before the United Nations Security Council to protect shipping off the coasts of countries 
susceptible to pirate attacks.  On April 4, 2008, pirates using small boats came alongside 
and boarded the cruising yacht Le Ponant, taking its crew hostage; twenty-two of the 
crewmembers were French.  The pirates released the vessel and hostages after the owner 
of the yacht paid a ransom.  However, once the pirates returned to shore in Somalia, a 
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vehicle, destroying its engine.  There were conflicting reports over whether some of the 
pirates were killed, but nonetheless, six of the twelve hostage-takers were taken into 
custody for trial in French courts.132 
At the United Nations Security Council, the French government sought a new 
international agreement wherein countries would be requested to consent to foreign naval 
forces entering their territorial sea when engaging in operations against pirates and armed 
robbers endangering the safety of life at sea.133  Passage of such a new maritime 
convention would enable the United States and all other nations to pursue pirates, 
terrorists, and other armed robbery suspects as sea, wherever they may try to escape, 
including the territorial waters of other nations.  This would be especially important along 
the borders with Mexico and Canada, and island nations in the Caribbean, as the Coast 
Guard could have the authority to pursue pirates, i.e., terrorists, into adjacent nations’ 
territorial waters without having to stop at the border to ask that nation’s permission. 
D.   SRI LANKA 
Beginning in the 1970s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and other 
Tamil separatists groups demanded that an independent state be established in areas of 
Sri Lanka inhabited by ethnic Tamils. The LTTE, also known as the Tamil Tigers, has 
used conventional, guerrilla, and terror tactics, including some 200 suicide bombings, in a 
bloody, more than two-decade-old civil war that has claimed more than 60,000 lives and 
displaced hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankans. The U.S. State Department lists the 
LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization. 
The Tamils are an ethnic group who live in southern India (mainly in the state of 
Tamil Nadu) and on Sri Lanka, an island of 19 million people off the southern tip of 
India. Tamils comprise about eighteen percent of the island’s population, and most live in 
northern and eastern areas. Their religion (most are Hindu) and Tamil language set them 
apart from the three-quarters of Sri Lankans who are Sinhalese—members of a largely 
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Buddhist, Sinhala-speaking ethnic group. When Sri Lanka was ruled by the British, the 
Tamil minority was seen to have received preferential treatment. Since Sri Lanka became 
independent in 1948, the Sinhalese majority has dominated the country. The remainder of 
Sri Lanka’s population includes ethnic Muslims as well as Tamil and Sinhalese 
Christians.134 
As noted above, the LTTE group is known for the significant number of suicide 
bombings carried out by its members.  The LTTE is also well known worldwide for its 
expertise and frequent use of maritime small boat assets that carry out suicide attacks at 
sea by driving explosive-laden small boats into Sri Lankan naval vessels and commercial 
vessels.135  The maritime small boat suicide bombers are known as the Tamil Sea Tigers 
or the Black Sea Tigers, and they have had numerous successful attacks, including 
sinking large commercial ships, a Sri Lankan Fast Attack Ship with the loss of ten to 
fourteen crewmen, and the Sri Lankan command ship Abitha.136  As of 2004, twenty-two 
maritime suicide attacks had led to the large scale destruction of ships and naval vessels, 
and the deaths of at least eighty-eight persons.137 
Captain Pelkofski, formally of the Joint Operations Directorate at U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command, wrote that, although the maritime environment has remained relatively 
calm in the Global War on Terror, “a sustained, destructive storm churns over the 
horizon. Despite the inherent challenges, Al-Qa’ida can attack, has attacked, and will 
again attack maritime targets.”138  Referring to the Sea Tigers and the Tamil separatist 
groups specifically, he stated that the skilled, organized and equipped maritime arm of 
the LTTE presents al-Qa’ida with an excellent organization to copy.139  He noted that the 
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LTTE perpetuated its maritime terrorism expertise by training its members “in a maritime 
school and academy, formally packaging and publishing a body of knowledge applicable 
to maritime terrorism.”140 (A discussion on maritime piracy and its implications for 
maritime terrorism is discussed in Chapter VII, below). 
Sri Lanka and the LTTE successfully reached a temporary ceasefire in 2002 while 
they discussed an autonomous region for the Tamils in the North and East, but since the 
2005 tsunami and the recovery period afterward, the LTTE has increased its attacks and 
the Sri Lankan military has responded harshly, including using intelligence agents to set 
up assassinations of LTTE leaders. Indian intelligence agencies helped the Sri Lankans to 
target air strikes against LTTE strongholds, and the LTTE has recently lost control over a 
large portion of their eastern territory.141 
E.   NATO 
After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) undertook a maritime security operation called Able Endeavor in the 
Mediterranean Sea; up to eight NATO vessels keep track of vessel and cargo flows over 
the entire Sea, including the Straits of Gibraltar, with a goal of detecting and deterring 
terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. This maritime operation was one of the immediate 
means that NATO undertook to show solidarity with the United States after the attack, 
after invoking Article 5’s “Collective Self Defense” clause.142 
Since Operation Able Endeavor’s inception, the NATO vessels have “monitored” 
over 75,000 vessels, boarded over 100 suspect vessels, and escorted nearly 500 large 
commercial vessels.  The escorts of the vessels were designed to prevent a USS Cole or 
M/V Limburg type attack, and to protect the free movement of oil through the region, as 
more than 65% of Western Europe’s oil supplies pass through the Mediterranean Sea.143  
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Some NATO nations, mainly Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey, contribute directly to the 
operation with naval assets. Escort operations in the Straits of Gibraltar involve the use of 
fast patrol boats from Northern European allies Denmark, Germany and Norway; Spain 
also provides additional assets in the straits.144  The escorts in the Straits of Gibraltar 
generally use the small fast boats because of the narrowness of the straits and the 
numerous commercial ships passing through that entrance every day. 
F.   INTERNATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED 
Although the nations mentioned above have responded differently to the threat of 
maritime terrorism, some general “lessons learned” can be incorporated by the United 
States and the U.S. Coast Guard’s PWCS mission concerning the small boat attack threat.  
All maritime nations have benefited from the increased use of shared intelligence to try 
and stop the maritime terrorists before they get on the water to begin their attacks.  This 
“intelligence” runs the gamut from the naval and air patrols used by Israel for MDA, 
electronic sensing devices, patrols by vessels in Southeast Asian areas where terrorists 
may have hidden enclaves for the staging of attacks, and the general human intelligence 
gathering involving the fostering of relationships and the use of spies and informants 
such as those that helped Sri Lanka increase its success against the LTTE.  These sharing 
activities emphasize the need for the United States to cooperate with its maritime 
neighbors by sharing maritime-related intelligence. 
As it is generally very difficult to stop a small boat attack once it has commenced, 
the best opportunity for success, worldwide, has come from gathering intelligence 
beforehand, maintaining an active presence in the areas where these attacks could be 
staged, and cooperation and collaboration between neighboring maritime nations.  The 
situation for detecting preparations for a small boat attack in the United States is different 
from many other nations because of the vastness of U.S. territorial waters, meaning that 
the most likely point of attack will come from vessels already within those territorial 
waters.  Additionally, as shared intelligence has proven to be an effective tool means that  
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intelligence sharing here will be required not only with international partners, but also 
with federal, state and local partners.  Sharing of information is what’s most important, 
whether it be government-to-government or agency-to-agency. 
  41
IV.   RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING RELATING TO 
MARITIME TERRORISM 
Because of the vast number of possible attack locations in the United States, the 
U.S. Coast Guard and its federal, state and local agency counterparts must use risk-based 
decision-making tools to attempt to deter attacks where they are most likely to originate.  
While many new technologies and many possible tactics and patrols could all be useful in 
reducing the vulnerability of vessels to attack, the cost of countermeasures as compared 
to the risk will always be a necessary part of the calculation.  
A commonly-accepted formula for risk evaluation is: risk = (threat x 
vulnerability) x consequence. Threat equals the likelihood that a given 
malicious action or attack will be initiated against a specific target, 
vulnerability equals the likelihood that a particular malicious action or 
attack is successful and consequence equals the measure of loss 
experienced in case of a successful attack.145  
146
 
Before any country, including the United States, allocates its limited port security 
funding and the man-hours of its Coast Guard and other federal/state/local agency 
personnel, it should conduct a recognized and accepted risk management process to 
determine whether the expenditure reduces the risk sufficiently to be justifiable.  After a 
while, the implementation of additional countermeasures will not reduce the risk 
sufficiently to be justifiable.147 
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Figure 4.   As The Cost of Countermeasures Rise, The Alleviated Risk Decreases148 
A cooperative requirement to patrol/visit those areas (marinas, boat ramps, etc.) 
where an attack could more likely be staged should be implemented inside U.S. territorial 
waters in order to act as a deterrent; direct costs and costs in man-hours would be limited, 
as most of the locations of the marinas are nearby where Coast Guard and other agencies 
regularly patrol.  U.S. internal maritime forces, including the Coast Guard, other federal 
agencies (ICE, CBP, etc.) and state and local law enforcement agencies, must make it a 
daily part of their homeland security/law enforcement activities to visit areas where these 
attacks may originate, while also encouraging the participation of the maritime public in 
reporting suspicious activities.  Hence, while the exact level of the specific risk and threat 
of a small boat attack occurring is difficult to ascertain, these specific types of patrols and 
community interaction can be undertaken with little additional cost and effort, thereby 
make the expenditure to reduce the risk acceptable. Further specific special patrol and 
presence activities should also be performed in those areas that are normally far from any 
regular law enforcement presence in order to eliminate the possibility of safe refuge in a 
remote marina, despite the possible increased cost, as the buy-down of risk of an attack 
emanating from marinas in those areas would be reduced  
In a recent article published in the Maritime & Border Security News on July 25, 
2007, Christopher Doane and Joseph DiRenzo III, two retired Coast Guard officers, 
discussed the National Small Vessel Security Summit sponsored by DHS that was held in 
June 2007149 to let small boat owners and state and local governments discuss any 
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concerns relating to the possible implementation of new security regulations on small 
vessels.150  While the U.S. government and DHS have mainly concentrated on large 
vessels and containers, the U.S. Coast Guard has always had concerns about small 
vessels, due to its history of search and rescue efforts, its previous anti-rum-running 
activities during prohibition, and its current drug war and countering illegal maritime 
migrants’ efforts.  However, with the increased risk of suicide attacks by small, 
explosive-laden vessels,151 the most common weapon of choice of maritime terrorists the 
world over, the U.S. Coast Guard and the nation must begin to think about the small boat 
threat in an entirely different way, and view possible increases in regulation as only a 
minor cost and inconvenience for a greater good.  
In the United States, small vessels have been commonly used for centuries for 
maritime smuggling of people, drugs and other contraband (Doane and DiRenzo also 
noted that smaller vessels are often used to rendezvous with a larger vessel offshore to 
carry the illicit cargo into the nation in a less detectible mode, and that these forms of 
smuggling can be used to smuggle terrorists and their weapons as easily as drugs or 
illegal migrants152).  For example, in October 2008, five Mexicans attempted to enter the 
U.S. from Mexico using a small boat.  Customs and Border Patrol detected the vessel 
because of its suspicious movements and notified the Coast Guard in San Diego, who 
dispatched two 33-foot vessels.  They located and stopped the vessel, determined there 
were five immigrants attempting to enter the U.S. illegally, and took them into 
custody.153  A photo of the small boat used is shown in Figure 5, below.  Perhaps this 
event and others like it could have been prevented had there been additional regulatory 
requirements to own and operate the vessel that the migrant-smugglers may not have 
been able to meet. 
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Figure 5.   Vessel Used in Smuggling Attempt154 
As discussed above, despite the obvious threat of small boat attacks, the 
International Community, the Congress and DHS, and the Coast Guard have mainly 
focused on creating security regulations that concentrate on larger vessels and on the 
content of containers coming into the United States.155  As an example, when the Coast 
Guard set up its MDA Directorate,156 it emphasized in the directorate’s documents the 
importance of interagency cooperation and planning by stating the “Coast Guard MDA 
plans, policy and assessments office will focus on the development of interagency and 
USCG plans and processes that drive MDA development and on outward looking 
threats,” and called for the Coast Guard to assume sponsorship of new programs such as a 
nation-wide AIS and long range vessel tracking.157 AIS would require beacons to be 
placed on board all large vessels so that their movements, both locally in port areas and 
worldwide, could be monitored by any coastal state.158 Clearly the United States’ 
primary MDA focus has been and is concentrated on interagency planning with other  
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federal and state agencies, and on creating ways to focus security efforts on inbound and 
on outward-looking threats, instead of planning for the most obvious and already-
documents threats from small boats.   
That is not to say that DHS and the Coast Guard have taken no significant actions 
against the possible small boat threat. Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has greatly increased 
its security patrol and small vessel boarding activities and now escorts a much larger 
number of vessels with its now machine-gun carrying small boats.  However, because of 
the historically-proven threat to the maritime transportation system that comes from 
smaller vessels carrying explosives, the Coast Guard and DHS must address this threat 
better, and they should use risk-reducing activities when determining what methods to 
employ.  Fortunately, there has been a recent trend in that direction, including the Small 
Boat Summit, discussed above, and publication of the SVSS.  The current Commandant 
of the Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, in his State of the Coast Guard speech on 
February 13, 2007, stated that “we’re beginning to discuss what we need to do to address 
regimes regarding recreational vessels, un-inspected tug and barges, and small passenger 
vessels.”159 Also, DHS Secretary Chertoff, when speaking at the national Small Boat 
Summit, also noted the concern about possible small vessel terrorist attacks by stating 
that “[h]istorically, terrorists like Al-Qa’ida have used small vessels to carry out 
operations. They did so with respect to the USS Cole.  They did so with respect to a 
French tanker [Limburg], so that this is certainly a threat that has some historic 
legacy.”160  The threat has been clearly identified, and the proposed actions to reduce that 
threat outlined in Chapter VIII take into account risk-reduction strategies required to 
make cost effective decisions. 
A.   THE REALITY OF THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES 
Secretary Chertoff previously noted that the U.S. is concerned that small vessels 
could be used as conveyances to smuggle weapons, including weapons of mass 
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destruction, into the United States.  He noted the Congress’s concern about weapons of 
mass destruction being brought into our ports inside a container, but stated  
but I have to tell you that if all we do is worry about containers, it’s as if 
we’re locking the front door and we’re kicking the back door wide open. 
Because there’s also a concern that we have that someone might seek to 
smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into a seaport, not using a 
container, but using a commercial vessel, including a vessel that is below 
300 gross tons.161  
Concern over the threat of the import of WMDs via the supply chain, i.e., 
including vessels, was echoed by DHS Under-Secretary Charles Allen when he spoke to 
the Maritime Security Council in stating  
while we currently assess that al Qa’ida lacks a WMD capability, it is 
equally clear that they intend to obtain this capability and would not 
hesitate to employ such a device should they obtain one. Since Terrorists 
lack a missile delivery capability for such weapons, our concern is their 
use of the supply chain to deliver a device directly and employ it in a 
major city.162  
Speaking specifically of the small boat threat to the United States, Mr. Allen stated that, 
over his more than twenty years of working on terrorism issues, these types of attacks 
have spread from the eastern Mediterranean to the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea to the 
Philippine Sea, and that “this raises my concern regarding the possibility that one day, 
maritime attacks will reach our shores.”163 Even Albert Einstein was aware of and afraid 
of the possibility of a nuclear bomb being brought into a U.S. port and exploded, as he 
stated to President Roosevelt in a letter from August 1939:  “A single bomb of this type, 
carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together 
with some of the surrounding territory.”164 
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Previous Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Collins wrote in 2004 that  
the Coast Guard’s ability to protect America against threats emanating 
from the U.S. maritime domain requires unprecedented information, 
intelligence, and surveillance capabilities to anticipate where, when, and 
how adversaries may intend to harm us. Our maritime security missions, 
as well as all other Coast Guard missions, rely on situational awareness.165  
Today, situational awareness of the near shore maritime domain remains a problem 
beyond the current capacity of the Coast Guard, due to its relatively small size and 
numerous other missions.  Again, as noted by MDA Director High, awareness remains 
the most important of the part of the Coast Guard’s maritime strategy, and proper 
awareness of the threat will lead to better prevention, preparation, and responses.  
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V.   THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
SMALL BOAT TERROR THREAT 
Nearly four decades ago, President Richard Nixon launched the war on drugs.  In 
1969, he declared that winning the battle against drug abuse was one of the most 
important of the urgent national priorities confronting the United States at that time.166  
That battle has continued to be waged since then, with annual costs currently estimated at 
$40 billion.  The war has been fought by attempting to eradicate drugs where they are 
grown or manufactured, to interdict drugs as they are smuggled into the country by land, 
sea and air, and to keep drugs off the streets, where law-enforcement crackdowns have 
resulted in over 500,000 imprisonments over these forty years.167  
The war on drugs has a direct correlation to the threat posed to the United States 
by small boat operators.  Drug traffickers have recently become more successful at 
slipping drugs past U.S. Coast Guard efforts to interdict them at sea by using new 
technologies and submarine-like watercraft (discussed below).  The U.S. military and the 
DHS are increasingly concerned that terrorist organizations will see this success and 
attempt to emulate it by bringing terrorists and weapons into the United States via these 
same means.  Therefore, despite numerous indicators that the drug war has had little 
overall success, this thesis argues that it should be maintained and/or even increased, in 
order to provide some deterrent value against those that would seek to enter the United 
States via a small craft from foreign lands. 
Numerous studies, including those from the Rand National Defense Research 
Institute and the Government Accountability Office,168 have shown that interdiction on 
the high seas or at border crossings do not lead to a reduction in the flow of cocaine or 
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heroin onto American streets, with most analysts agreeing that successful interdiction has 
only pushed the problem to different locations around the hemisphere.  For example, 
when interdiction efforts in the 1980s basically stopped the trafficking of drugs through 
the Caribbean into Florida, Mexico then became the leading drug trafficking area.169 
Also, one of the goals of the drug war interdiction effort was to decrease the supply of 
drugs on U.S. streets and thereby greatly inflate their prices so as to discourage 
consumption.  However, while interdiction cost outlays averaged almost $1.8 billion from 
1994 to 2003, the price of cocaine and heroin have stayed remarkably steady,170 thereby 
showing evidence that that goal has not been accomplished.  
However, not everyone agrees that the war on drugs is not working.  The White 
House Office of National Drug Control Policy points out that there is now decreased drug 
use among teenagers, record seizures of cocaine on the seas and increasingly disrupted 
domestic methamphetamine production, etc.171 “If you take the magnitude of a problem 
that was burning high and hot and spreading, but you constrain it, you choke it down, 
push back against it, you make it smaller – that is, I believe, victory.”172   
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has attempted to discourage drug use and to 
lessen demand by tying drug buyers to terrorists.  The U.S. government even put up 
television ads during the Super Bowl in 2002 to show that when U.S. citizens use drugs, 
it is often the terrorists that benefit.173  It should be noted that the 2001 National Drug 
Control Strategy only mentioned the word “terror” three times, and that all three were in 
reference to street terror, but all subsequent Strategy publications have indicated a strong 
tie between drugs and international terror.174   
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A.   DRUGS AND THE FINANCING OF TERROR GROUPS 
The resurgence of the Afghanistan drug trade after the defeat of the Taliban 
should not have come as a surprise.  In an article for the Pacific News Service just one 
month after 9/11, Earl Hutchinson wrote that a victory by the United States and its allies 
in Afghanistan would surely result in a surge of heroin in America’s inner cities.175  He 
noted that, although the Taliban had officially banned and severely reduced the amount of 
opium grown during their rule, they had only banned “cultivation” and not the opium 
trade; Hutchinson suggested that they may have been planning to increase the world price 
of opium to better fund their operation.176  Today, the ease of growing opium and 
subsequently obtaining enormous profits as compared to other crops has proven to be too 
strong a temptation for the Afghanis to resist.  
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in May 2003, Debra 
McCarthy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, an agency within the Department of State, testified that, when state 
sponsorship of terrorism came under increased scrutiny and greater international 
condemnation, terrorist groups looked increasingly to drug trafficking and other criminal 
activities as sources of revenue.177  She also noted that, unlike criminal organizations 
who were involved in drug trafficking for profit, drug trafficking for terror groups often 
had a two-fold purpose.  Some terrorists not only obtained the funding they desired, but 
they also believed they could weaken their enemies by flooding their societies with 
addictive drugs; therefore, too many terror groups, drug trafficking can be religiously 
justified by describing it as a direct weapon used against western societies.178  
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While the amount of financing that terror groups obtain from drug trafficking has 
significantly increased since the post-9/11 crackdown on state supported terrorism, terror 
groups profiting from drug trafficking is not a new phenomenon.  On December 9, 1994, 
the General Assembly of the United Nations issued a Declaration on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism, wherein it expressed its concern “at the growing and 
dangerous links between terrorist groups and drug traffickers and their paramilitary 
gangs, which have resorted to all types of violence, thus endangering the constitutional 
order of states and violating basic human rights.179  
A 1996 GAO report entitled “Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles 
of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology,”180 stated that the U.S. was trying to 
reign in the amount of money earned by drug trafficking organizations by concentrating 
its efforts on reducing production, U.S. demand, and money laundering.181  Deputy 
Assistant Secretary McCarthy, in her testimony as mentioned above, also noted that in 
the government’s efforts to reduce funding to terrorists through money laundering, there 
“is no appreciable difference between anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing assistance. In each case, the objectives and tools are the same: we must build 
and institutionalize comprehensive regimes to help counter money laundering and 
terrorist financing.”182 
There are few, if any, other activities with such huge profit margins available to 
terror groups or organized crime groups as drug trafficking; at the same time, laundering 
of the funds obtained by trafficking is the activity that causes these groups to be most at 
risk of detection.  In testimony before the same subcommittee on May 11, 2004, John 
Roth, Chief of the FBI’s Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering 
Section, stated that most criminals sell drugs, commit securities and bank fraud, murder 
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and extort in order to make money.183  But, once acquired, this money must somehow 
enter the legitimate financial system in order to be useful to the criminal.  This cash – a 
criminal’s greatest objective—is also one of his greatest vulnerabilities.184   
Drug trafficking gives a good example.  Twenty two pounds of heroin will 
yield a trafficker about a million dollars.  Having made this money, the 
drug dealer must now find a way to do something with it.  That street cash 
would weigh about 256 pounds – ten times the weight of the drugs sold.  
For major drug trafficking organizations [and by implication, terror 
groups] this effect is multiplied.  Drug dealers that sell $1 billion worth of 
cocaine must contend with 256,000 pounds of illicit currency.  That bulk 
represents true opportunity for law enforcement.185 
B.   THE WAR ON DRUGS, THE WAR ON TERROR, AND SMALL BOATS 
In a publication entitled “The War on Terror Versus the War on Drugs,”186  the 
authors noted that there were several similarities and differences between the two 
“wars.”187  One similarity was that, just as sealing the border against cocaine and heroin 
has proven impossible, border interdiction is likely to be even less successful against 
explosive agents, nuclear materials or biological weapons, and detecting tens or even 
hundreds of terrorists amongst millions of border-crossers is almost impossible using 
current methods and technologies.  Among the differences is that drug trafficking 
organizations are interchangeable, and thus the removal of one organization will have 
little effect, as others will simply take its place, while terror organizations are highly 
individual, and thus the removal of an organization like al-Qa’ida might make a large 
difference in the security of the United States.188  Finally, the author suggests that the 
largely successful campaign against the American mafia, a campaign against a specific 
group of organizations rather than against a class of activities, may provide much more 
                                                 
183 John Roth, “Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering Investigations: Who Investigates and How 
Effective are They?” Testimony before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 
May 11, 2004, http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/108hrg/97396.pdf. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid.  
186 Mark Kleiman, Peter Reuter, and Jonathan Caulkins, “The War on Terror and the War on Drugs: A 




insight into successful anti-terrorist policy that does the diffuse and less successful drug 
war.189  Hence, according to the author, the U.S. should not fight a class of activities, i.e., 
a war on terror, but rather pursue a specific war and a specific war strategy against al-
Qa’ida, the Shining Path or FARC. 
The legalization of drugs lobby has also taken up the cause that the war on drugs 
is in fact a boost to terrorists. In a recent article, Sheldon Richman stated that  
what makes the [illegal] drug industry so lucrative is the U.S.-led effort to 
stamp it out. With prohibition come high risks and thus elaborate efforts to 
hide drug-related activity – in a word: the black market . . . Black markets 
tend to be run by the most ruthless and despicable characters and those 
who would have no problem in using violence to obtain their 
goals/profits.”190 
The very definition of a terrorist.  The author then ends the article with the statement that 
“let’s be blunt: the U.S. government helps finance terrorism.”191 
Both liberal and conservative Americans have spoken out in favor of legalizing 
drugs to take the profits out of the hands of the traffickers.  In 1995, the National Review 
published a symposium of articles wherein even William F. Buckley, Jr., the 
conservative’s conservative, was among the various authors that advocated the 
legalization of all drugs.  He called the war on drugs “a plague that consumes an 
estimated $75 billion per year of public money, exacts an estimated $70 billion a year 
from consumers, is responsible for nearly 50 percent of the million Americans who are 
today in jail, occupies an estimated 50 percent of the trial time of our judiciary, and takes 
the time of 400,000 policemen.”192   
The ties between the war on drugs and the war on terror, as specifically relating to 
the small boat threat, were discussed in several recent articles concerning the increased 
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use of submarine-like vessels by drug trafficking organizations.  Such difficult-to-detect 
vessels have been identified as possible means of use by terrorists in the future.193  The 
author described these new types of vessels as up to 80 meters in length with a sleek 
design, capable of skimming just below the surface, thereby making them extremely 
difficult to detect from surveillance aircraft and patrol boats.194  Several examples of 
these vessels are shown below in Figures 6 through 9. 
“[T]hese semi-submersibles, which exhibit some of the same characteristics as 
military submarines, mark a significant advancement in the ability of drug smugglers to 
slip past coastal defenses.”195 Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Thad Allen, stated that 
he believed that the increased use of the semi-submersible was in direct response to the 
Coast Guard’s successful tactic of using snipers in helicopters to shoot out the engines on 
drug smugglers’ speedboats.196  
 
 
Figure 6.   An Example of a Semi-Submersible Submarine197 
 
                                                 
193 “Drug Smugglers Now Use Minisubs; Terrorists May Use Them Too,” Homeland Security Daily 
Wire, August 18, 2008, http://hsdailywire.com/single.php?id=6675. 
194 HSDailywire, “Drug Smuggler Use Mini-Subs.” 
195 Ibid. 
196 Jeanne Meserve and Mike M. Ahlers, “Coast Guard Hunts Drug-running Semi-subs” CNN.Com, 
March 20, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/03/20/drug.subs/. 




Figure 7.   A Semi-Submersible Submarine Moored between Two Boats198 
 
Figure 8.   A Semi-Submersible Submarine on Shore199 
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Figure 9.   A Semi-Submersible Submarine at Sea200 
In the article accompanying Figure 8, above, the Boston Globe’s Bryan Bender 
wrote that the growing numbers of semi-submersible type watercraft had “set off alarms 
at the highest levels of the U.S. military and DHS.”201 Counterterrorism officials fear that 
what drug runners now use to deliver cocaine, terrorists could one day use to sneak 
personnel or weapons into the United States. Navy Admiral James Stavridis, commander 
of the U.S. Southern Command, also warned that “if drug cartels can ship up to 10 tons of 
cocaine in a semi-submersible, they can clearly ship or rent space to a terrorist 
organization for a weapon of mass destruction or a high-profile terrorist.202   
The threat from these vessels will only continue to grow; Coast Guard intelligence 
officers predict 85 cases of semi-submersible use this year (2008) and 120 next year.203  
Therefore, as noted above, by “tracking people, cargo, and money, we can disrupt a plan 
to use a small boat laden with explosives rather than simply react to the attack.”204  The 
war on terrorism is primarily a war of information. Interagency and international 
cooperation is critical for putting together the pieces of the intelligence puzzle.205 
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VI.  PIRACY: PREVIEW OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF THE 
FUTURE? 
The semi-submersible is just the most recent example of the increased threat 
posed by small boats against the maritime transportation industry, the U.S. Navy and 
Coast Guard vessels, and the nation’s ports and maritime critical infrastructures.  The 
concurrent recent increase in successful piracy attacks throughout the world also has 
grave implications for copycat activities by maritime terrorists.  As pirates have become 
more successful in recent years, their success, much like the increased success of the 
semi-submersible watercraft, could inspire the maritime terrorists.  Captain Pelkofski of 
U.S. Fleet Forces Command, when discussing the Sri Lanka Sea Tigers, noted “the 
skilled, organized and equipped maritime arm of the LTTE presents Al Qaeda with an 
excellent organization to copy;”206 the same would seem to apply to the successful tactics 
used by pirates.  If the terrorists see the ease with which most pirates are able to take 
control of large vessels, they are likely to learn from and copy these tactics for their own 
use in future maritime terrorist attacks. 
An example of the ease with which most pirates are able to seize vessels was 
discussed in a recent article in the Washington Post.207  The article, while first describing 
a successful escape from pirates off the Somalia coast by a Japanese vessel, also 
discussed how, in the few days before this unsuccessful attack, other pirates had seized 
four other vessels and their crews, including a Malaysian palm oil tanker with thirty-nine 
crew, an Iranian bulk carrier with twenty-nine crew, a Japanese chemical tanker and a 
German cargo vessel.208  While the motives of most current pirate attacks are financial, 
seeking ransom for the vessels and crews, it is frightening that a chemical tanker with 
possibly hazardous material on board could so easily be seized and put under the control 
of criminals.  This has grave implications, because criminals/terrorists operating small 
                                                 
206 B. Raman, “First Maritime Terrorism Attack of 2006.”  




boats have demonstrated the ability to take over large dangerous cargo-carrying vessels 
anywhere in the world, including waters close to ports in the United States.  Suppose that 
pirates take over a tanker carrying six hundred tons of liquefied natural gas and turn it 
over to terrorists.  The terrorists could turn it into a floating bomb and sail it into the port 
of Los Angeles, where the explosion would cause a fireball with a diameter of 1,200 
meters, destroying almost everything within this range and causing a large number of 
fatalities and casualties well beyond it.209 
Just recently, a group of pirates attacked and seized control of the M/V Faina, a 
Ukrainian flagged vessel, as it passed near the Somalia coast on September 25, 2008.  
The significance of this specific pirate attack was that the vessel was carrying military 
cargo, including thirty-three tanks and tons of ammunition.  There also remains a dispute 
as to where the military cargo was ultimately destined to arrive, with the Ukraine and 
Kenya governments stating that the equipment was to be accepted by Kenya, but with 
varying evidence that the military equipment was bound for Southern Sudan and Darfur, 
where recent civil war and ethic violence has made headlines.210   
As of the writing of this thesis, the Somali pirates on board the vessel have made 
demands for millions of dollars in ransom money to free the vessel and its crew, and the 
U.S. and other navies, including Russia’s, have positioned their warships in the area to 
watch over the Faina and the pirates.  The pirates have stated that if they are attacked they 
will defend themselves until every last one of them is killed.  However, in a hopeful sign 
that their concerns are strictly monetary, the pirates reportedly turned down a request 
from Islamic insurgents in Somalia for some of the arms.211 
                                                 
209 Cindy Vallar, “Piracy Versus Terrorism,” Pirates and Privateers; The History of Maritime Piracy, 
August 2008, http://www.cindyvallar.com/terrorism.html quoting Joshua Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes 
in Southeast Asia,” Military Technology, May 2005, 16. 
210 Nick Wadhams, “The Somali Pirates: Tanks but no Tanks.” Time, October 9, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1848772,00.html. 
211 “Hijacker Somali Pirates: We’ll Fight to the Death before Surrendering to U.S., Russia,” 
Foxnews.com, October 6, 2008, www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,433322,00.html. 
  61
 
Figure 10.   U.S. Navy Photo of the Pirates Who Seized the M/V Faina212 
An important result from the hijacking of the Faina is that the United Nations 
passed a resolution calling on all nations with a stake in maritime safety off Somalia to 
send military ships and aircraft to counteract the increase in maritime piracy in that 
region.213  UN Resolution 1938 (2008) gave all nations’ militaries the right to use “the 
necessary means” to stop piracy.214  While the resolution currently applies only off the 
coast of Somalia, a precedent has been set for the UN to give permission for all maritime 
militaries to use all means necessary to stop the terrorist/pirate threat. 
The maritime world has dealt with pirates for centuries, and the logical tie 
between piracy and terrorism can be deciphered by reading the words of the 16th century 
jurist Alberico Gentili’s De jure belli:  “Pirates are common enemies, and they are 
attacked with impunity by all, because they are without the pale of the law.  They are 
scorners of the law of nations; hence they find no protection in that law.”215  Gentili 
recognized piracy as a threat not merely to the state, but to the idea of statehood itself.  
All states were equally obligated to attack pirates, whether or not they had been attacked 
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by pirates themselves.216  Burgess argued that international law should be changed so 
that the war on terror would become akin to the war against the pirates, thereby making 
the crime of terrorism defined and proscribed internationally, and ensuring that terrorists 
would be properly understood as the enemies of all states.  This legal status would bring 
universal jurisdiction, and terrorists could be captured wherever they are found by anyone 
who found them.  Pirates are currently the only form of criminals subject to this special 
jurisdiction.217 
In a recent article in USA Today218 a spokesman for the U.S. Fifth Fleet in 
Bahrain stated that the United States had stepped up its patrols to deter terrorists off the 
Somali coast, as bolder and more violent pirate attacks had been occurring there.  The 
U.S., in addition to stepping up patrols against these pirate activities, has sometimes 
intervened to rescue hostages and ships, and has increased its intelligence sharing in the 
area.  In response to the UN Resolution 1838 allowing nations to intervene and take all 
necessary steps to stop piracy, NATO has sent ships to the waters off Somalia to help in 
the battle against pirates.219 
Worldwide last year, pirates attacked 269 ships, took nearly 300 hostages, and 
killed five people.  That represents nearly “a 10% increase over the previous year, and 
it’s probably only half of it, given International Maritime Bureau estimates that an equal 
amount of attacks go unreported.  Shipping companies often prefer to swallow their 
losses than to risk losing customers or insurance rate hikes.”220 All maritime nations are 
asked to report any pirate attacks or suspicious to the International Maritime Bureau, 
which tracks attacks and issues warnings to vessel when pirate activities are suspected in 
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a region.221  Despite all the military actions, ransoms paid, etc., there remains no 
consensus on how to solve the pirate problem.  The varying approaches include the recent 
payment of ransom by a South Korean shipping company to free one of their vessels, and 
the recent attack and re-takeover of a pirated ship by military members of a semi-
autonomous region of Somalia.222 A ten-year review of piracy attacks is included in 
Figures 11 and 12. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Actual and Attempted Acts of Piracy, 1994-2006223 
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Figure 12.   Location of Actual and Attempted Acts of Piracy, 1994-2005224 
These armed attacks on cargo ships, oil tankers, and cruise ships are estimated to 
cost more than $1 billion a year, according to Peter Chalk, a senior security analyst at 
RAND Corp., “Piracy does affect U.S. commerce. It is to the economic interest of the 
U.S. that the sea lanes are as stable as possible.”225  As an example to follow, the U.S. 
and the maritime nations of the world should look at the progress made in the Strait of 
Malacca area in Southeast Asia, as noted in Chapter II.  The U.S. military donated 
equipment, coordinated joint training exercises, and nudged Indonesia to cooperate with 
its two maritime neighbors Singapore and Malaysia, in order to get better control of this 
important area for oil and cargo shipments.226 The U.S. also bolstered Indonesia’s Navy 
with fifteen high-speed patrol boats and seven radar units. It trained with the navies from 
these three countries and persuaded them to share intelligence about ships passing 
through their waters, and Malaysia agreed to coordinate joint air patrols between the three 
countries to surveil the waterway.227 The efforts seem to be working, as only thirteen 
                                                 





pirate attacks were reported in the first six months of 2008, versus sixty-four attacks in 
the first six months of 2007.228  Again, domain awareness and visible presence seems to 
be the major contributor to lessening the threats from small boat pirate attacks. 
However, awareness and military presence should not be the end all of anti-small 
boat activities, and commercial ship-operating companies are taking actions on their own. 
The recent spate of pirate attacks has caused ship owner and insurers to look for an array 
of high-tech self-help tactics against such attacks.  Among the offerings being used by 
vessels passing through dangerous areas are “night-vision equipment, high-powered 
water guns, ear-splitting claxons, and a lubricant foam that makes it difficult for pirates to 
get their footing.”229  The night-vision infrared radar equipment allows vessel operators 
to see small boat movements at a distance even at night, the water guns can keep the 
pirates/terrorists from being able to maneuver their vessels close enough to gain access to 
the vessel, the claxons make a close approach painfully loud for approaching pirates, and 
the lubricant foam makes it very difficult for any pirate/terrorist to climb up ladders to 
access the vessel’s deck.  These and other anti-small boat attack technologies are further 
discussed in Chapter IX. 
The world’s maritime nations have also taken steps to allow military vessels to 
approach and attack pirate ships even when those small boats have retreated into a 
nation’s territorial waters.  United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1816, 
pushed by the U.S. and passed on June 2, 2008, allows the U.S. and its coalition allies to 
intervene by “all means necessary” for the next six months to stop piracy off the Somali 
coast,230 while the latest UN Resolution, number 1838 noted above, does not have a time 
limit).  This same legal authority could be expanded elsewhere throughout the globe 
wherever pirates and/or maritime terrorists attempt to operate. 
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Given the concentration of effort by the United States on the war on terror 
worldwide, and the fact that the government must always allocate limited financial 
resources, many have argued that the U.S. should not be spending such huge amounts on 
its interdiction efforts because, as noted above, most of the justification for the war on 
drugs was that the interdiction efforts would make the drugs so expensive on the streets 
that most people would choose not to purchase them.  That has clearly been proven not to 
be the case. However, the increasing threat posed by semi-submersible vessels, pirates, 
and any future maritime terrorism tactic, including the illegal shipment of weapons, calls 
for the U.S. to maintain its interdiction efforts in offshore waters in order to attempt to 
address these new threats and the ongoing threat posed by small boats attempting to enter 
the U.S. via the maritime border.231 As further argument for the continued use of 
forward-placed interdiction assets, the attempted illegal entry into the United States via 
the maritime border is expected to increase over the next several years as fences and 
other activities are increased along the land border with Mexico,232 and the continued 
illegal international shipping of military weapons continues,233as noted by Newsweek’s 
Fareed Zakaria:  
Every year, warlords, gangsters, militiamen, and terrorists kill tens of 
thousands of people in wars that are only sporadically reported to the 
outside world. They do their butchery using weapons obtained and 
delivered, to all sides of these conflicts, by [gray-market arms providers]. 
These are real weapons of mass destruction in the post-Cold War world, 
taking lives and shattering communities from the slums of Baghdad to the 
jungles of Colombia, from the streets of Beirut to the impoverished 
diamond-mining hamlets of South Africa.234   
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With no effective international controls on the buying and selling of arms, plus 
the limited enforcement or even awareness of the shipping of these weapons by land or 
by sea, “the criminal-terrorist nexus in these areas will continue to threaten the U.S. and 
our allies”235 and U.S. Coast Guard and other law enforcement (LE) agency efforts to 
counteract these threats at sea must continue. 
At the same time, government non-maritime efforts must be increased to 
concentrate on eliminating money-laundering efforts of terrorist and organized crime 
groups.  This is where the drug trafficking organizations are most vulnerable, and success 
in those efforts would force the drug smuggling organizations to reduce operations and 
thereby sending fewer semi-submersibles towards the United States.  
However, to address the current threats posed by vessels as they approach U.S. 
borders, new technology and increased Coast Guard and law enforcement presence 
activities will have to be implemented in the near-short environment (see Chapter VIII, 
below), as “smaller irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – will find ways, as 
they always have, to frustrate and neutralize the advantages of larger regular 
militaries.”236  Because the maritime terrorists and criminals are always attempting to 
find ways to counteract efforts to stop them, the U.S. must also be vigilant in always 
trying to stay one step ahead of their changing tactics.  
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VII.   CURRENT U.S. INITIATIVES RELATING TO HUMAN 
INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT) GATHERING EFFORTS AGAINST 
THE SMALL BOAT THREAT IN U.S. WATERS 
A.   AMERICA’S WATERWAY WATCH 
While the Coast Guard and DHS have generally concentrated their security 
regulations and activities on larger vessels arriving in the U.S. from foreign ports, they 
did not completely ignore the need for greater MDA in the local environment.  In 2005, 
the U.S. Coast Guard initiated the America’s Waterway Watch (AWW) program,237 
which was described in a Coast Guard press release238 as being similar to the 
Neighborhood Watch program currently operating in many communities.  
The AWW program was an attempt to involve the boating community in 
homeland security, because the Coast Guard and the DHS determined that the 
cooperation of all members of the maritime community is necessary for waterside 
awareness: 
Public and private interests not only can build partnerships to help security the 
maritime domain – they have to. In the same way that a police force in a democratic 
society cannot hope to maintain order in a city without the help of key constituencies, so 
effective maritime security is unattainable without the support of key members of the 
maritime community.  These range from other states, flag registries, shipping companies, 
and merchant mariners to recreational yachtsmen.239   
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Part of the problem the Coast Guard or any port police force faces is discerning a 
terrorist needle in a haystack of thousands of legitimate recreational boaters. The U.S. has 
no national registry or national system of operator licensing for the 18 million 
recreational boats in the United States, and currently, the only way to anticipate whether a 
boater may pose a risk is by observing the vessel and its operator’s behavior.240 
However, as discussed below, the vast majority for the responsibility for the 
implementation of the AWW maritime community involvement program was placed on 
the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, a volunteer, non-military non-law enforcement 
organization that mainly assists the active Coast Guard with patrols, search and rescue, 
boat operator training, etc.  The Coast Guard Auxiliary is a uniformed voluntary 
component of the Coast Guard acting as a force multiplier by assisting the active duty 
Coast Guard with all missions other than law enforcement and military action.241  The 
Auxiliary, with a membership of only approximately 27,000242 was already an extremely 
busy organization before the AWW program responsibilities were added to its everyday 
normal duties of boater education, vessel safety checks, search and rescue, and general 
maritime assistance.  Further, the only real action required by the AWW program was to 
advise boaters and others to call a toll-free number to report suspicious activity. 
The AWW program is described on the first paragraph of its website as an effort 
by the Coast Guard in “enlisting the active participation of those who live, work or play 
around America’s waterfront areas” in America’s security.243 The site also describes the 
program as being similar to the successful Neighborhood Watch program that asks 
community members to report suspicious activity to local law enforcement agencies.  
However, the website correctly notes that, unlike the Neighborhood Watch program, the 
AWW program only asks persons to report suspicious activities via a telephone number 
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(persons seeing suspicious activities are advised to call 877-24WATCH); there is no 
requirement to formally join an organization, there are no meetings, membership cards or 
membership requirements, and participants do not become agents of the Coast Guard or 
any other law enforcement agency.244  
Therefore, in its present configuration, the AWW program is little more than a 
911 emergency phone system for boaters.  Today, small notices are posted in most 
marinas and boat launch areas with the AWW phone number; and pamphlets are also 
usually available in most marinas, ferry terminals, dive shops, etc.  Also, as noted above, 
the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, whose services include training boaters on proper vessel 
operation, and performing vessel safety checks, has sought to include AWW training in 
their classes with the public, but the value of such training is questionable and has 
apparently had little success.   
The shortfalls of the present AWW program’s goal to inform the boating public 
were made very clear to the Commandant and Secretary Chertoff at the National Small 
Vessel Security Summit, when virtually all of the small boat operators in attendance 
stated they were not aware of the program at all; in fact, one of the items that the boaters 
brought up during the meeting was a request that the Coast Guard should create such a 
system so they as boaters could participate in the maritime security mission!245 
However, despite the program’s lack of publicity, the AWW website itself does 
provide significant valuable information designed to assist persons operating on and near 
the water in reporting suspicious activities.  For example, there are linked sections 
entitled “What is suspicious activity” where websites visitors are told what suspicious 
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unusual operation of a small boat accompanied by video taping or 
photography; people taking still photographs or video from shore near a 
facility or vessel; seeing persons engaged in surveillance; persons asking 
unusual questions; seeing a new large hole in chain link fence around a 
facility; persons renting a boat saying they are going fishing but who bring 
no fishing equipment or bait, etc.246   
The website also tells them to look for suspicious activity under bridges or near tunnels, 
near commercial facilities like chemical or petroleum plants; near military installations, 
and near ferry and cruise ships terminals. It advises them of what to look for in describing 
the suspicious person (attire, hair, color, age, body shape, etc.) to better assist law 
enforcement in identifying suspects.247   
While there is certainly valuable information available on the website and in 
brochures, etc., boaters and the marine public have only rarely been aware of this 
information.  The limited number of available Auxiliarists and the limited amount of time 
they have available to do realistic security training calls for a different approach.  
B.   THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM 
The Neighborhood Watch program requirements are a good start for improving 
the boating and private maritime community’s participation in the AWW program and in 
the nation’s MDA.  The National Crime Prevention Council, the sponsor of the 
Neighborhood Watch program, is a private non-profit organization that states on its 
website248 that its primary mission is to enable people to create safer and more caring 
communities by addressing the causes of crime and violence and reducing the 
opportunities for crime to occur. The NCPC website contains ready-made training 
materials for interested communities to use when implementing their Neighborhood 
Watch programs.249  
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What makes the Neighborhood Watch program different from the Coast Guard’s 
AWW program is that the NCPC program calls for meetings, memberships, selecting 
leaders, canvassing of neighborhoods to recruit volunteers, working with local agencies, 
creating daily patrol groups, sponsoring clean ups of the area and other special events, 
etc.  By these means, the volunteers get to know their neighbors and their community; 
they actually take action in patrolling their local areas, and therefore they are much better 
able to understand when something unusual may be going on in their community. The 
creation of such a modified Neighborhood Watch/AWW group in various port areas and 
in large marinas could significantly add to the nation’s situational awareness and security.  
One of the boating public’s leading publications also thinks that greater Coast Guard and 
boating public contact is warranted, as “at some point the boating public has to help with 
the problem of promoting safety and security on the water! . . . here is an area where we 
must all pull together for the common good.  What is needed? How about meetings by 
the Coast Guard with various boating groups to lay out the problems and develop 
solutions?”250 
However, the Coast Guard and the Coast Guard Auxiliary currently do not have 
sufficient members to coordinate all the Neighborhood-Watch type groups that could and 
should be established in the maritime arena, i.e., marina areas, boat launch areas, 
anchorage areas, etc.  Therefore, until the membership levels of the Coast Guard and 
Auxiliary are increased, in order to begin to implement the revised AWW program 
immediately, active duty Coast Guard, reserve Coast Guard, Coast Guard Auxiliary 
members, and federal, state and local agency personnel need to first get involved in 
creating these Neighborhood Watch-type committees in the highest risk areas of the most 
important ports. The Coast Guard positions could be designated as full time “maritime 
community liaisons” at each local Sector office, whose sole duties are to recruit, train, 
establish and maintain ongoing and involved memberships at marinas, boat ramps, dive  
 
 
                                                 
250 John Anthony, “Small Boat Threat?” Boat/US Magazine, May 2007, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BQK/is_/ai_n19154779. 
  74
shops, boat dealerships, etc., in their AOR, similar to the requirements for a 
Neighborhood Watch leader who follows a pre-determined checklist to keep the program 
up and running.251 
In order for this to occur, the shortage of trained Coast Guard personnel needs to 
be addressed.  The current membership in the active duty Coast Guard is approximately 
41,000, although in the MTSA Act of 2002,252 Congress authorized the Coast Guard to 
increase its membership up to a maximum of 45,500.  The Coast Guard and Congress 
need to get together to immediately fund and train the several thousand additional Coast 
Guard members needed, so that the Coast Guard can allocate hundreds of its members to 
these maritime community liaison positions on a full-time basis, in addition to relieving 
personnel resource shortfalls throughout the Coast Guard.  The small boat threat is real 
and it must be addressed by having full-time members concentrating on the coordination 
of and maintenance of these maritime watch groups made up of boat owners, marina 
owners, fishermen, etc.  The members of the maritime community will likely be more 
inclined to report suspicious behavior because they will be more comfortable in reporting 
their sightings and suspicions to someone with whom they are already familiar. 
C.  OTHER POSSIBLE RECOMMENDATIONS/OPTIONS TO AID IN 
AWARENESS AND MDA 
One option for increasing MDA and increasing the participation of the boating 
public would be to make the boaters and other maritime recreation participants more 
aware of, and encourage their participation in, the activities of the Area Maritime 
Security Committees. The Area Maritime Security Committees, which were also created 
by a section of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002253 to bring port  
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stakeholders together, are not reaching their full potential.  As part 103.305 of Title 33 
Code of Federal Regulations indicates, all of the members of the Committee must have 
an interest in the security of the area, and the regulations specifically call for  
membership from the federal, state, tribal and/or territorial governments, 
local public safety/crisis management/emergency response agencies, law 
enforcement and security agencies, maritime industry including labor, and 
other port stakeholders having special competence in maritime security or 
those stakeholders affected by security practices and policies.254  
Why haven’t arrangements been made for the regular boating community or 
marina public to become members or at least associate members of these committees?  
Such opportunities should be created.  Are the boating public and maritime communities 
even aware of when the meetings take place? Without additional inclusive membership or 
associate member provisions, dive boat charterers, surfing groups, local lifeguards, even 
shell collectors, beachcombers and water taxi drivers, etc., will likely never be aware that 
they could be a part of the Coast Guard’s security program. 
Another recommendation is to be more proactive in having state registration 
departments provide information on the AWW program to their customers.  Because 
every state and territory in the United States requires that its vessels be registered and that 
vessel registration numbers be posted on every vessel, Congress or the states themselves 
could be encouraged to create legislation requiring that states provide information on the 
Coast Guard’s AWW program when they mail the annual registration certificates to the 
boat owners.255  There could also be a requirement imposed to paste the AWW shield 
and phone number on the windshield of all vessels, just as most states require vessel 
registration information be posted on the vessel.  The various states could also offer 
incentives for boaters to become members in the maritime neighborhood watch program, 
perhaps by lowering their annual registration fees for watch-group members.   
Boaters and the maritime public could also be given financial incentives for 
providing information on suspicious activities that leads to an arrest, just as many land-
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side law enforcement organizations do via tip lines, etc.  The federal government has 
begun a parallel program working towards the reporting of suspicious terrorism-related 
activities by the recent implementation of the National Suspicious Activities Report 
Initiative (NSARI).256  The NSARI follows a program implemented by the Los Angeles 
Police Department, where local officers are trained to identify and report about sixty-five 
behaviors that could indicate terrorist preparations, and this reported activity is then 
vetted by LAPD intelligence experts. 
A fourth option would be for the Coast Guard to require that an AIS-type position 
and identification beacon be placed onboard every small vessel in the United States, as is 
done in Singapore.  These vessel operators could also be required to notify the Coast 
Guard whenever they were underway.  While this would certainly give the Coast Guard 
additional MDA of the small boat community, this option is unrealistic and possibly 
unconstitutional, and should only be imposed in emergency situations or after an attack 
has occurred, as will be discussed in Chapter XI.  It would be impossible for the Coast 
Guard to be able to track the simultaneous movement of millions of small vessels without 
an investment of billions of dollars in tracking equipment and the hiring of thousands of 
monitoring personnel.  Additionally, freedom of movement without undue government 
interference is a hallmark of this nation’s constitutional democracy.257 
As discussed above, every day there are hundreds of thousands of boaters on the 
water, both recreationally and commercially.  At any given time, thousands of civilians 
are underway, fishing, skiing, whale watching and diving in close proximity to U.S. 
coastlines and port complexes.  There are also hundreds of law enforcement and 
environmental protection specialists, Army Corps of Engineers personnel, and other 
government professionals working in the maritime environment.  The vast majority of 
these hundreds of thousands of boaters have communication equipment and/or cell  
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phones at their immediate disposal.  Therefore, there are hundreds of thousands of eyes 
on the water that, at any given time, could become part of the Coast Guard’s and DHS’s 
MDA programs.  They are a vast and mostly untapped security resource. 
The Coast Guard’s Waterways Watch program should be reconfigured to match 
the organization and performance of the very successful Neighborhood Watch program, 
and state vessel registration departments should be used as an asset to provide security 
information to the boating public. Permanent waterways watch groups should be created 
and maintained by a professional staff dedicated to their continuation and education.  
American citizens have proven themselves to be generally eager to assist their 
government and each other in the improvement of security.  The boating population, 
therefore, needs to be re-enthused, like the volunteer Shore Patrols performed by citizens 
during World War II.   
By creating these volunteer groups and training members, another security asset 
similar to the Coast Guard Auxiliary but much larger in scope will come into existence.  
With official membership and training, the maritime public could be inspired to become a 
real part of national defense and of the security of their own property.  With such an 
enthused and waterways watch-participating public, the United States would not only be 
safer from small boat terror attacks, but, as a side benefit, increased maritime surveillance 
would result in more criminal actions being stopped, including drug smuggling and 
illegal immigrant transportation.   
And, of note, had India had such an effective Neighborhood Watch/AWW type 
program as proposed above, the Mumbai terrorists may have been stopped before they 
started their bloody assault.  It was reported that a Mumbai fisherman had reported a tip 
to the Indian police that he had noticed persons (who later turned out to be part of the 
Mumbai terrorist group) who were using the Mumbai harbor to illegally import RDX, an 




nothing.258  Hopefully, with a fully implemented updated AWW program, persons 
reporting such suspicious incidents in the United States will have the assurance that their 
reports will be taken seriously and investigated.259 
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VIII.  A PROPOSED NEW NATIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR 
TACTICS AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS THE U.S. SMALL 
BOAT TERROR THREAT  
As the then-Coast Guard Commandant wrote in 2004. 
[our] ability to protect America against threats emanating from the U.S. 
maritime domain requires unprecedented information, intelligence, and 
surveillance capabilities to anticipate where, when, and how adversaries 
may intend to harm us.  Our maritime security missions, as well as all 
other Coast Guard missions, rely on situational awareness.260  
To follow on with that imperative of increased situational awareness as related to 
the inshore maritime environment and the small boat threat, the Coast Guard and its state, 
local and industry partners/stakeholders must implement new tactics and uses of 
technologies to increase situational awareness of those areas where small boat attacks 
may be staged or originated.  This remains true despite the Coast Guard’s increased 
arming of its small boats to deter and/or defend against a small boat attack since 9/11, as 
it is this author’s opinion that it would be very difficult to always successfully stop a 
small boat attack is already underway with the current Coast Guard weapon system. 
As noted above, the situational awareness of the near shore maritime domain 
remains a problem beyond the current capacity of the Coast Guard to completely 
maintain without assistance from the maritime and boating public, but the Coast Guard 
itself, and its partners, must do more than just get the maritime community to be more 
involved.  
While the maritime environment is certainly unique,  
small-boat threats resemble other terrorist plots and have a similar 
signature. They require recruiting, training and planning, surveillance and 
intelligence collection, operational security, logistical support, rehearsals, 
information operations, and execution. On the other hand, these threats 
have some unique characteristics and considerations. They can require 
unique attributes and knowledge such as maritime skills (e.g., sailing and 
                                                 




scuba diving); familiarity with the target area (such as traffic patterns near 
a port facility); or explosives training. Unique environmental concerns that 
can affect the planning and conduct of maritime attacks include weather, 
tides, and other variables that could affect the dependability and reliability 
of the strike method.261 
Several of these factors, especially training, surveillance, rehearsals, logistical support 
(placing of weapons on a vessel), can potentially be deterred by increased presence and 
surveillance activities by the Coast Guard and other agencies in areas where these small 
boat attacks may be staged and launched; i.e., at marinas, boat ramps, beaches/coves, etc.  
“Deterrence” is one of the strategic applications of the nations’ goal of preventing the 
next terrorist attack, as outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and is 
defined as the “successful persuasion of offenders and potential offenders not to injure 
others, due to the knowledge of risks or the perception of failure.”262 The increased patrol 
and intelligence gathering activities described below will be even more effective in 
cooperation with suspicious activity reporting by members of the maritime community 
who have become familiar with the AWW program.  
Recently, the Eleventh Coast Guard District, which covers all waters and ports 
within the State of California,263 launched Operation Focused Lens to specifically 
address the small boat attack threat by identifying those areas where a small boat attack 
could be staged or originated, and then call for prioritizing law enforcement presence 
activities in those areas identified as higher risk areas for the staging of such an attack.  
The specific goal of the operation is to provide a focused and coordinated presence in 
areas where small boat attacks may be originated, staged and/or implemented. Then 
establishing an armed law enforcement presence in and about high risk marinas and boat 
ramps may deter terrorists from using those areas for the pre-planning and 
implementation of a small boat attack.   
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Another major goal of this operation is to coordinate activities with other 
government agencies, especially federal, state and local law enforcement agencies with a 
maritime nexus.  This goal can be accomplished by explaining the goals for the operation 
and seeking the local agency’s enthusiastic involvement in extending patrol and presence 
capabilities; it would also include the development of Memorandums of 
Understanding/Agreement (MOU/MOA) with local law enforcement agencies to 
augment the patrol and visit efforts of each other.  This is an important step.  Preventing 
terrorism is a new role for many public safety agencies.  They are used to responding to 
daily emergencies, not preemptively stopping acts of war in their jurisdictions.264 
The goals of the operation - the deterrence of terrorist/criminal activities by 
increased presence activities, increased cooperation and coordination of local agencies 
and the maritime community, and greater awareness of what activities may be suspicious 
- accomplish many of the goals outlined in the Office for Domestic Preparedness 
Guidelines for Homeland Security published in June 2003.  The Preparedness Guidelines 
noted that a cultural shift, away from stove-piping, in addressing the homeland security 
threat will come about through a process when it: “[i]dentifies a prime mover (an 
organization, person, or event); identifies public and private stakeholders; establishes 
meetings of the stakeholders; and articulates the mission, goals, objectives in preventing 
terrorism, etc.”265 
The genesis for this operation began after my colleague in the District Eleven 
enforcement branch, LCDR Matthew Wadleigh, attended DHS’s National Small Vessel 
Security Summit in June 2007 in Washington, DC.  He returned and began looking for 
ways to implement tactics that might minimize the threat in California waters.  Together, 
he and this author developed a planning order that, in addition to calling for increased 
presence and intelligence-gathering efforts by Coastguardsmen and local law 
enforcement, it also called for the increased use of Coast Guard Auxiliary members for 
maritime observation mission patrols in and around these areas, and the Auxiliary’s 
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increased training of maritime community members on AWW in the identified marina 
and boat ramp areas.  The Coast Guard local intelligence units in each port, called Field 
Intelligence Support Teams (FISTS) were tasked with increasing intelligence gathering 
efforts in and around these same prioritized high risk marina areas.  Finally, the planning 
order called for certain areas to be called “Homeland Security Surveillance Areas,” 
signified by posted signs, just as many neighborhoods are posted with signs identifying 
them as Neighborhood Watch areas, in order to act as a further deterrent. 
However, before any specific presence activities could be implemented, we 
determined it was necessary to provide a means by which Sectors could identify which 
marinas, boat ramps and other areas that were a higher risk for use by a terrorist group as 
a staging area for attacks.  LCDR Wadleigh and I developed a matrix that the local Sector 
offices could use to prioritize the hundreds of marinas and boat ramps in their areas of 
responsibility (AOR) in terms of the relative risk that a small boat attack operation would 
be staged at that facility.  We named the resulting matrix the Staging Area Point of Origin 
matrix, with its unfortunate acronym of SAPOO.  However, the SAPOO matrix has 
proven to be a valuable tool in the identification of higher risk/priority areas that require a 
higher lever of Coast Guard and other law enforcement presence. 
The Sectors were tasked to individually visit all the marinas and boat ramps in 
their areas of responsibility, and score their risk level using the SAPOO matrix.  The 
SAPOO Matrix includes various point-giving steps, so that a score for each marina, boat 
ramp, etc., could be generated that would identify that marina’s risk for being used as a 
staging area for a terrorist group’s small boat attack plan.  The main planning and point-
generating criteria used in the SAPOO matrix were: 
• Size.  Was the marina large, medium or small?  Marinas containing 100+ 
berths were categorized as large marinas, while those with fewer than fifty 
berths were categorized as small marinas.  In the matrix, more points were 
given to small marinas, because large marinas are likely to be much more 
populated, and therefore, any suspicious behavior was much more likely to 
be noticed at a larger, more heavily-trafficked marina than a smaller one. 
• Isolation.  How often was the marina or boat ramp area visited by the 
Coast Guard or other law enforcement agencies?  We determined that a 
marina that is rarely if ever visited (either by boat or by landside patrol), is 
much more likely to be desirable to a terrorist, as the risk of detection is 
  83
significantly lower.  Therefore, points in the matrix were assigned based 
on the frequency of law enforcement officer presence in those marinas and 
boat ramps. 
• Security level. If a marina had a full-time professional security presence 
along with sufficient lighting and communication capabilities, fencing, 
etc., then the amount of points added to the matrix score were significantly 
less than those for a marina with little or no organic security. 
• History.  A history of criminal or suspicious activity at a marina was 
considered an important indicator of future activities of the same sort. This 
matrix quantifier was given additional weight compared to the other 
quantifiers. 
• Information regarding specific threats.  Any information related to a 
specific threat against a marina would multiply its matrix score and 
significantly raise its priority score.  If for example, our intelligence 
agencies were able to identify such a specific threat, then the SAPOO 
matrix would exponentially increase the priority score for that marina, and 
would almost guarantee its being identified as a high priority marina. 
• Other.  Point-distributing portions of the SAPOO matrix also included the 
proximity of the marina or boat ramp area to a maritime critical 
infrastructure or other high value maritime assets, as close proximity to a 
desired target would likely be a goat of a small boat terrorist, and the level 
of AWW knowledge and/or training by persons located at that marina.  
This knowledge was considered an important factor, as marina-resident 
knowledge of how and where to report suspicious activity should make 
that marina less likely to be used by a terrorist as a staging area as he 
might feel that he was always being watched. 
Internal security concerns prevent us from revealing the actual points and scoring 
equations for the SAPOO matrix in this thesis.  After the matrix was completed and 
scores for each marina and boat ramp were generated, we left the determination of what 
score would cause a facility to be designated as “high priority” to the discretion of our 





Figure 13.   Components of the SAPOO Matrix 
Once the marinas, boat ramps, etc., were prioritized by the Sector’s SAPOO 
matrix according the risk of their being used by terrorists for staging or originating a 
small boat attack, the operation then directed that these high priority areas be 
visited/patrolled a certain number of required times per month.  The local Coast Guard 
unit or local LE entity that was responsible for visiting the marina or other facility was 
directed to visit it for a duration of time sufficient to establish a deterrent presence, i.e., 
the visiting authorities could not just breeze by the marina and check it off as having been 
patrolled. The idea of sufficient deterrent presence was based upon the premise that the 
visiting agency personnel should stay there long enough to determine if something was 
out of the ordinary. For example, was the security guard at his entrance gate position 
and/or doing his patrols? Was the lighting still working properly?  Was there an unusual 
amount of activity going on, etc.  It is important to know what is normal so that one can 
thereby know what is not normal, and it has always been an edict of warfare that knowing 
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the enemy is crucial to success.266  The operation also required that a certain number of 
boarding of underway small vessels should be boarded in the vicinity of the highest 
scoring marinas/boat ramps, in order to cause fear to a possible small boat terrorist that 
they could be randomly boarded at any time. 
The patrolling/visiting officers were also encouraged to actually talk with the 
people at the facility, both to ask them if everything was normal, and to discuss the 
AWW program and how to report something suspicious. Coast Guard members and local 
law enforcement agents involved in the program were also instructed to always wear their 
personal radiation detectors (“rad pagers”) when visiting and walking around the 
facilities, so that any unusual radiation emissions from a vessel or storage area might be 
detected, as missing and stolen radiological material has been reported every year for 
quite some time,267 and this poses an additional threat to the United States.  If a small 
boat terrorist wanted to create additional fear and panic with his small boat attack, a small 
amount of radiological material could be infused within the improvised explosive device 
to cause a dirty bomb scenario in the maritime environment.   
Additionally, in the future it is intended that Coast Guard visiting officers will 
also receive behavioral detection training so they will be better able to detect if there is 
something unusual in the behavior of the persons they are interviewing or observing.  
Behavioral detection involves specifically training personnel to watch for body language 
and facial cues for signs of bad intentions.268 Visiting/patrolling agents were also directed 
under to operation to conduct their required patrols at random times and with differing 
methods.  Both nighttime and daytime patrols were encouraged, and visits could be 
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performed by patrol boats, by land via foot patrols, and even occasional patrols by 
helicopter.  The randomness of time and method of these patrols is a tactic used to try and 
frustrate the terrorist who might be surveilling that marina for use as a possible staging 
point. We do not want the terrorist to know when we will or will not be there.  Hopefully, 
the lack of a routine time and method of patrols would cause the terrorist to choose 
another location where he can be more confident of a lack of detection or give up the 
mission entirely. 
Our Coast Guard Sector offices were also tasked by the operation to provide 
AWW training at a certain number of the higher risk marinas and boat ramps each month, 
usually using auxiliary members, and sector intelligence personnel were directed to do a 
certain number of intelligence gathering efforts at various high priority marinas each 
month.  At the end of each month, our sector offices are required to report their 
percentage of compliance with the minimum activity requirements of the operation, 
identifying the number of patrols performed, the number of persons trained in AWW, the 
number of vessel boardings, and how many intelligence gathering efforts were 
implemented, etc.  The sectors were also required to identify any gaps or shortfalls in 
their compliance with the minimum requirements and their plans for addressing those 
shortfalls in the future. 
This combination of unexpected and random types and times of patrols and vessel 
boardings in areas rarely visited by law enforcement personnel, the increased awareness 
and participation in the neighborhood watch-like AWW by the persons living in and 
visiting these marinas and boat ramps, and the increased level of intelligence gathering by 
our local agents, will hopefully make it difficult for any terrorists to gain the anonymity 
required to stage a small boat attack anywhere in the Eleventh Coast Guard District, and 
hopefully in the future, this operation’s techniques will be adopted throughout the United 
States to lessen the threat of a small boat attack anywhere in U.S. waters. 
  87
IX.   USE OF TECHNOLOGY AGAINST THE SMALL BOAT 
TERROR THREAT 
Technology can and should be combined with the improved AWW program and 
the implementation of anti-small boat terrorism-specific operations like Operation 
Focused Lens, to create a fully rounded and layered approach to the small boat terrorist 
threat in the maritime environment.  Citizen involvement is not enough, and the Coast 
Guard and local law enforcement personnel simply cannot be everywhere in the vast 
maritime environment. 
Defense Secretary Gates emphasized the importance of the inclusion of citizen 
involvement in the reporting of suspicious activity when he discussed the IED threat in 
Iraq.  He stated that “the best way to defeat these weapons – indeed the only way to 
defeat them over the long run – is to get tips from locals about the networks and the 
emplacements, or, even better, to convince and empower them to prevent the terrorists 
from emplacing them in the first place.”269 The same holds true for vessel-borne 
improvised explosive devices, i.e., the small boat threat, in U.S. ports.  It is essential to 
have the public involved in the observation and reporting of suspicious activity in order 
to be successful against this threat. 
However, in that same article concerning the IED threat in Iraq, General Meigs 
stated that increased human intelligence/tips alone will not completely solve the IED 
threat.  Technology must also be used to detect the IEDs.270 Similarly, while the 
intelligence obtained from the boating public will greatly assist in the anti-small boat 
terror threat program, that involvement alone will not completely solve the small boat 
threats in U.S. waters nor will increased efforts on the part of the Coast Guard or other 
agencies be the complete answer.  Technology is a crucial component to any planned 
total solution, especially considering Secretary Chertoff’s stated concerns about small 
boats being used to bring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) into the nation’s 
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ports.271  A Hiroshima-sized nuclear bomb (15 kilotons) detonated in a port in a major 
city could kill 50,000 to one million people, result in property damage of $50 to $500 
billion, losses in trade disruption of $100 billion to $200 billion, and indirect costs of 
$300 billion to $1.2 trillion.272 
Relevant technologies applicable to the small boat threat are characterized for the 
provisions of this section into five general areas: (a) sensors to remotely detect the 
presence of WMD or bomb-making materials in small boats; (b) scanning technology to 
look inside small boats to detect unaccounted-for persons (MARFLIR); (c) tracking 
technology to monitor the movements of all vessels within a port area (includes AIS, 
VTS systems, radar), (d) technology that vessels themselves can use to 
detect/deter/prevent an attack once it is underway against their vessel, and (e) future 
developing technologies. 
A.   SENSORS TO DETECT THE PRESENCE OF RADIOLOGICAL 
MATERIAL ON SMALL BOATS 
While DHS, through its Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), has 
installed radiation detection equipment in most major U.S. ports,273 the nation’s anti-
nuclear laboratories have helped to create easily-transportable devices that can detect the 
presence of radiological material within fifteen meters.  The Lawrence Livermore 
Laboratory, in conjunction with Innovative Survivability Technologies, developed the 
Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor (ARAM), which has the ability to detect even small 
amounts of radiation as a moving vehicle or vessel passes by.274 These sensors are now 
small enough and technologically advanced enough to be used on small boats at sea, as  
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they are approximately 2' by 4' by 16" in size.  These sensors need only be placed in a 
close proximity to a small boat to be able to detect whether there is radiological material 
on board.   
For example, a Coast Guard 25-foot vessel could approach any other small boat 
and pull within ten yards or so to have a friendly discussion with the boat operators while 
at the same time scanning that vessel for the presence of radiological emissions, all 
without the boater ever being aware that he is being scanned.  This would enable small 
boats to scan a much larger number of small boats than the normal procedure of stopping 
and randomly boarding a vessel with radiation pagers (“rad pagers”), which are also a 
very successful product.  The Coast Guard is also working with the Homeland Security 
Department’s Science and Technology Directorate to enhance and expand its capabilities 
in the detection and interdiction of chemical and/or biological agents.275 
These portable radiation sensors can now not only show that there is a 
radiological emission, as the rad pagers do, but can identify the type of material at the 
same time.  Once radiation data is detected, the ARAM sends its preliminary 
identification of the type of radioactive material to an adjacent laptop, and/or the 
information can be sent via a communication network to the nearest National Laboratory 
for review/identification by a radiological expert. This also shortens the normal Coast 
Guard boarding procedure, wherein if radiological emissions are discovered by the 
boarding party at sea, the boarding party must wait for another vessel to bring out the 
“level II” device, which analyzes the type of ions coming from the material to determine 
what it is.  Only then, when the level II device identifies the material as something that 
may be sinister, does the call go out to Department of Energy experts for assistance.  This 
proposed new sensing technology eliminates several of these steps. 
This technology will allow one small boat to scan another small boat for the 
presence and identification of the radiological material, or the sensor can be incorporated 
into a stand-alone buoy that can sense and transmit data from passing small boats.  
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Additionally, the ARAM can be network with other ARAMS to provide coverage of an 
entire area.276  However, the buoy system will currently only be viable in areas of limited 
navigability, i.e., a narrow channel, because the detector’s current limited range, as the 
vessels must be forced to navigate within fifteen yards of the buoy for it to be effective.  
Therefore, in a wider channel, a series of buoys or a combination of vessels and buoys 
would be required to scan every vessel passing by. 
This same concept will be tested in an experiment by the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office’s (DNDO)277 “Maritime Pilot” program, which will be implemented in 
San Diego and the Seattle area.278  The DNDO is an organization within DHS that is 
specifically tasked to prevent the unauthorized import, use, storage, and development of 
nuclear material that could be used against the United States.  Its strategic objectives are 
the following. 
• Develop the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture  
• Develop, acquire, and support the domestic nuclear detection and 
reporting system  
• Fully characterize detector system performance before deployment  
• Establish situational awareness through information sharing and analysis  
• Establish operation protocols to ensure detection leads to effective 
response  
• Conduct a transformational research and development program  
• Establish the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to provide 
planning, integration, and improvements to USG nuclear forensics 
capabilities279  
                                                 
276 Pekoske, “Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology, and the Human Element.” 
277 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0766.shtm. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, under 
the Homeland Security Department, is a jointly staffed office established April 15, 2005 to improve the 
nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or 
transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the nation, and to further enhance this capability 
over time.  
278 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection 
Project,” September 5, 2007, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1189012515699.shtm. 
279 U.S. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, “Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: Strategic Objectives,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0766.shtm. 
  91
The DNDO and the nation are realistically concerned about a radiological-type attack 
against the United States, based on the well-known desire of al-Qa’ida to obtain a 
weapon of mass destruction and the news that, in 2003, al-Qa’ida received some 
modicum of religious sanction for the use of WMD against the enemies of Islam by Saudi 
cleric Nassir bin Hamad al-Fahd, who issued an important and detailed fatwa on the 
permissibility of WMD in jihad. He stated that, since America had destroyed countless 
lands and killed millions of Muslims, responding in kind would be permitted.280    
The Maritime Pilot program will be implemented first in the Seattle area.  
Dozens of law enforcement and emergency boats in one of the nation's 
largest and most congested waterways will be outfitted this fall with 
radiation detectors aimed at preventing terrorists from smuggling deadly 
weapons into the country. The first-of-its kind test in Washington's Puget 
Sound will try to find out whether components for making radioactive or 
nuclear bombs could be picked up if they're hidden on a small boat 
cruising into a busy harbor. ‘We'll all suffer the consequences if we're not 
able to detect something,’ says Coast Guard Capt. Chip Strangfeld, who is 
working on the project with the Homeland Security Department's 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO).281 
It has not yet been determined what specific type of radiation detection equipment 
will be utilized during Maritime Pilot, but, significantly for Coast Guard and other 
agency purposes, the ARAM is now available in a fifteen-pound backpack.282  This 
equipment, or something similar, will significantly help the shoreside intelligence 
gathering processes discussed above in previous chapters, as Coast Guard and law 
enforcement agency members may now visit marinas, boat ramps, and other areas of 
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parked by the marina every day, scanning them for radiological material.  Minimal 
training is required, and the relative cost of each sensor is low: somewhere between $50-
75,000 for each unit.283 
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is also partnering with 
DNDO to train local law enforcement officers to use advanced radiation detection 
methods: specifically, the remote detection of radiation from helicopters and airplanes.  
During a recent training event with the Chicago Police, NNSA Associate Administrator 
Joseph Krol stated “NNSA has years of experience in radiation detection using airborne 
detectors in our own aerial Measurements System helicopters and airplanes.  We are 
looking forward to partnering with the Chicago police to better understand and use these 
systems in the most effective ways possible.”284 
The NNSA and DNDO will train police aviation units in radiation detection.  The 
training is designed to prepare law enforcement officers to conduct a radiological 
surveillance mission using a radiation detection system mounted on a helicopter.  This 
system detects gamma radiation and will help locate a potential dirty bomb or other 
radiological source.285  Such equipment and training could possibly be made available to 
Coast Guard helicopters.   
B.  USE OF FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED RADAR (MARFLIR) TO 
LOCATE PERSONS HIDDEN IN SMALL BOATS 
The Maritime Forward Looking Infrared Radar (MARFLIR) is already an 
invaluable tool for the detection of something abnormal at sea, especially the presence of 
hidden persons onboard a vessel.  The MARFLIR can be land-based or vessel-based, and 
would remotely identity the heat signature of persons on board a vessel by remotely 
scanning through its hull.  The MARFLIR system is an inverted stabilized 9-inch gimbal 
forward-looking infrared system designed specifically for the maritime environment.  It 
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can be mounted on a vessel’s mast or wheelhouse. It has a 10x continuous zoom lens and 
a high-sensitivity infrared detector, laser range finder and an auto tracker.286  This system 
has already been placed onboard some Coast Guard vessels and aircraft.287   
The MARFLIR system would be especially helpful in the maritime border areas 
of the United States.  The Coast Guard suspects that hundreds of illegal migrants enter 
the United States each month via small boats from Mexico.  MARFLIR would help 
indicate which vessels along the maritime border should be boarded as possible migrant 
smugglers. There are hundreds of small boats underway every day in the maritime border 
area, and it is almost impossible to determine which vessels are smuggling illegals.  The 
Coast Guard currently uses random boarding procedures in this area to deter smuggling, 
and has had very limited success in actually catching a vessel loaded with migrants. 
With the use of the MARFLIR onboard its vessels, the Coast Guard small boats 
will be able to direct its scanning rays at numerous vessels to determine which boats have 
what appears to be several bodies crouched down or hidden within their lower levels.  
The Coast Guard would then be able to board those vessels instead of utilizing its current 
random “needle-in-the-haystack” approach.  The MARFLIR sends an infrared signal and 
does not harm persons being scanned.288 
MARFLIR was successfully used by Coast Guard patrol boats in OIF to warn of 
the dangers posed by vessels before they came into firing range, and both the U.S. Navy 
and Coast Guard have bought the MARFLIR Systems as their standard thermal imaging 
system for MSC ships and for craft down to a 28-foot length. The initial contract for 
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FLIR head can be mounted on a masthead or wheelhouse; it carries a third-generation 
InSb focal plane array (3- to 5-micron) detector and a 10x continuous zoom lens, as well 
as a laser rangefinder and an auto-tracker.289  
The MARFLIR needs to become a more day-to-day instrument in the arsenal of 
the hundreds of Coast Guard small boats patrolling territorial waters, especially in the 
maritime border regions. 
C.  AIS/VESSEL TRACKING TECHNOLOGY 
The AIS is a digital technology that allows a vessel to “squawk” its position, its 
name/ID, and its course of speed to a receiving unit.  The national AIS system currently 
consists of terrestrial, sea, and space-based AIS Radio Frequency infrastructure capable 
of receiving AIS information from AIS-equipped vessels in U.S. ports, waterways and 
coastal zones.  Data storage, processing and networking infrastructure complements the 
AIS RF infrastructure. The system receives (and will soon be able to send) AIS messages 
via a very high frequency (VHF) data link.  AIS data is transported between system 
components over a wide-area network and diverse, remote site connectivity.290  The goal 
of the AIS program is that AIS data be combined with other government intelligence and 
surveillance data to form a holistic, overarching view of maritime traffic within or near 
U.S. and territorial waters.291  The basic premise of the above technological jargon just 
means that the Coast Guard can monitor the movement of vessels that have an AIS 
system on board.  However, AIS is currently only required for vessels over 500 gross 
tons per the MTSA Act of 2002, but there is nothing that would prevent its required use 
on small boats.   
There would be several benefits to requiring AIS equipment on all vessels.  It 
would enhance maritime security by being used to monitor the normal movement of AIS-
equipped vessels traffic in order to better identify anomalies, including the approach of a 
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small boat to the vicinity of a high-value vessel or facility.  There could also be a 
connection that would let a radar system identify which vessels in the area do not have an 
activated AIS system on board, which could serve as an early indicator of a possible non-
U.S. vessel in the area.  Additionally, the AIS system could help in search and rescue 
cases because it would identify which vessels are in the vicinity of a distressed vessel, 
and the AIS tracking data could also help with investigations as to the cause of a collision 
or other maritime casualty. 
The Coast Guard could impose movement restrictions and/or AIS beacon 
requirements on all vessels.292  The advantages to this Course of Action (COA) is that all 
vessel movements in the port could be monitored if they are equipped with the AIS 
systems and all suspicious small vessel tracks could be immediately countered.  The 
Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTP) could also order that boaters only get underway 
with COTP permission and only upon filing a report advising the Coast Guard of their 
planned movements.  The disadvantage to this COA is that the constitutional right to 
freedom of travel293 would be curtailed, and the Coast Guard does not have sufficient 
personnel to keep track of such a large number of small vessels and/or enforce the trip-
reporting requirement.  Hence, there would be little intelligence analysis and production 
based on the overwhelming movement data. 
Use of the AIS system would overwhelm current Coast Guard abilities in busy 
ports because it is almost impossible to keep track of hundreds of small boats in a 
confined area such as the ports of San Diego and Los Angeles.  However, requiring its 
use, even if the Coast Guard were not able to monitor all movements, would at least 
signal which vessels are compliant with U.S. requirements; the AIS tracking could also 
possibly show which vessel had recently crossed the border.   
D.   VESSEL “SELP-HELP” TECHNOLOGIES 
The Coast Guard has also implemented the Integrated Anti-Swimmer System, 
which enables the Coast Guard to deter and/or disable an underwater or surface attack by 
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a swimmer.294  The technology allows crewmembers on a vessel holding such equipment 
to speak clearly to a diver through an underwater speaker, warning him that he is entering 
a secure area and that action will be taken against him if he does not depart.  This system 
also allows the operator to send stunning sound waves directly at the swimmer if he does 
not depart. 
Another technology, the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), allows the Coast 
Guard or equipment operator to issue verbal warnings remotely to a boater, via a 
directed/focused sound acoustic energy wave, that he is approaching a restricted area.  
The focused sound wave can send a clear voice warning/directing message to the moving 
boater from distances in excess of 500 yards.295  The 33-inch dish emits a sound blast of 
up to 150 decibels, deafening and driving away would-be attackers. It proved remarkably 
effective in foiling a pirate attack on a British cruise ship off the Horn of Africa in 
2005.296  The Coast Guard and other agencies and industry personnel could also consider 
using visual and audible deterrence technologies to warn away boaters approaching a 
vessel or critical infrastructure. Visual deterrence could be provided by using 
technologies such as the Francis Searchlight, Francis FX,297 which has 28 million 
candlepower, which could be integrated into a remote control operation that would 
illuminate small boats nearing a larger vessel or a facility.  Audible alarms could be also 
integrated into the nation’s security system by simply adding high-power sirens to 
remotely indicate when a vessel has entered into a security perimeter or into a fixed 
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security zone.298  Floating barriers and fences, capable of stopping an advancing small 
boat before it hits a moored vessel, should also be a consideration.299 
E.  FUTURE POSSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES   
Technologies continue to be developed that could remotely turn off a vehicle or 
vessel’s engine, including high power microwave and electromagnetic pulse machines.  
In a similar vein, General Motors plans to equip 1.7 million of its 2009 model vehicles 
with a system that would allow pursuing officers to request that the engine be remotely 
turned off via satellite through the OnStar mobile communication system.300 The United 
States and/or the Coast Guard could possibly require such a device in all future boat 
engines.  Also, the Pentagon’s non-lethal weapons division is currently looking for 
technologies that  could “disable” aircraft, before they can take off from a runway—or 
block the plane from flying over a given city or stretch of land.  In its request for 
proposals, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate announced that they would like 
arms-makers to come up with a way to safely divert an aircraft in the air or stop and/or 
disable an aircraft on the ground.  The Directorate wants “reversible effects” in which all 
the targeted aircraft can be quickly returned to an operational condition with minimal 
time to repair.301  The Directorate’s program managers did not state how the engineers 
might create such a kill switch for aircraft, but however it was to be done, the Joint Non-
Lethal Weapons Directorate stated that they’d like to have a similar system to stop 
moving boats as well. The Directorate stated that “[t]hey’re looking for a device that can, 
from 100 meters away, safely stop or significantly impede the movement of vessels up to 
40 feet long, with minimal collateral damage.”302 
                                                 
298 See, e.g., “Cruise Ship Virtual Security Shield,” 
http://www.duostechnologies.com/downloadcenter/csvss.pdf. 
299 See, e.g., Whisprwave, “Maritime Homeland Defense and Force Protection Port Security 
Solutions,” www.whisprwave.com/port.htm. 
300 Chris Woodyard, “Device Can Remotely Halt Auto Chases; GM Will Equip New Vehicles with a 
Device Allowing Police to Remotely Stop Them,” USA Today, October 9, 2007, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Autos/story?id=3706113. 




Real and virtual underwater fences are also being developed.  Secure-Marine, a 
Netherlands-based company, is currently marketing “Secure-Ship” a high voltage fencing 
product similar to those use to enclose military bases. Wires strung from poles on deck 
emit 9000 volts, a non-lethal charge, but enough to deter intruders.303  British defense 
firm QinetiQ has adapted its military underwater sonar system, Cerberus, to the private 
yacht market by advertising that its product creates an underwater perimeter around a 
vessel that, when broken, triggers an alert that would identify an underwater swimmer, 
scuba diver or vehicle coming in under the water.”304 
Remote control investigating or deterring vessels are already under development.  
Because most pirates overseas approach ships posing as fishermen, coast guard officials 
or harbor police, vessels that are suspicious of an oncoming craft could use the “Sentry” a 
jet ski-sized remote-controlled scout with cameras, also developed by QinetiQ, while a 
vessel sensing danger from an approaching vessel could deploy the “Protector” a 30-foot 
unmanned surface vessel developed by BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, and an Israeli 
defense firm.  The Protector can be equipped with a 7.62 mm remote-controlled machine 
gun, and can be used to investigate and intercept boats up to ten miles away.305 
Remote explosives detection is a new field that should greatly expand in the 
future. A team at the University of Michigan led by Theodore Goodson has developed a 
material that can be incorporated into sensors which consists of large molecules arranged 
in a branching pattern.  These molecules fluoresce when illuminated by infrared light.  
However, when the presence of trinitrotoluene (TNT) vapor – the bomb making material 
in many improvised explosive devices - is detected, the fluorescence of the material is 
quenched as the TNT molecules are caught in the sensor’s branches.306 
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Wireless broadband connectivity in all ports is also a security tool that could be 
utilized to more easily allow communications between the port and nearby vessels.  The 
port authority of Singapore recently announced the “first in the world” wireless 
broadband access system set up in cooperation its industry partners that will allow all 
vessels within fifteen kilometers of the Singapore coastline to communicate using 
wireless broadband internet technology.307 
F.   TECHNOLOGY CONCLUSION  
The United States and the U.S. Coast Guard should immediately implement the 
proposed ARAM or other similar nuclear/radiological material detection program in 
conjunction with the increased use of MARFLIR technology, especially in the higher-
threat maritime border regions.  This increased use of technological capabilities, with the 
proposed greater involvement of the boating public in the nation’s revised 
AWW/MDA/HUMINT program discussed above, should reduce the threat posed by 
small boats in local waters.  This proposed program could be supplemented by the 
various other technologically advanced equipment discussed above, once they become 
more affordable and are proven effective. 
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X.   THE REASON FOR SMALL BOAT ATTACK PREVENTION 
ACTIVITIES: THE POSSIBLE NEGATIVE GOVERNMENTAL 
REACTIONS THAT COULD FOLLOW THE FIRST SUCCESSFUL 
SMALL BOAT ATTACK IN U.S. WATERS 
All of the above tactics, techniques, strategies and citizenship participation 
notwithstanding, the United States government and industry must have plans in place for 
dealing with the immediate aftermath of a successful small boat attack.  The point of this 
chapter is not to frighten the boating public, but to make them a little angry about what a 
terrorist act in U.S. waters could do to their livelihoods and freedom of movement rights.  
It has been shown that, when people responds to a terror attack with anger instead of fear, 
they were much more likely to be optimistic, to believe that threats can be controlled, and 
to support more aggressive anti-terror policies.308  It is to be hoped that, armed with the 
information in this chapter as to what impositions on their freedom could result, and 
angry at that possibility, members of the maritime community will increase their level of 
participation in AWW and become more involved in the daily maritime domain 
surveillance mission. 
Although it would probably not result in the level of fear induced by the attacks 
on 9/11, a successful small boat attack against a cargo ship, cruise ship, military vessel, 
or a shoreside critical infrastructure or petroleum processing facility would have 
immediate psychological, economic, and strategic consequences that will prompt the 
President, DHS and Congress to call for immediate remedial actions.  This is especially 
true because of the possibility of multiple similar attacks being planned and implemented 
after the first successful attack.   
There is little doubt that the United States will have to impose movement and 
other restrictions on the boating public to prevent possible follow-on attacks. Some 
restrictions will be very temporary, while others may call for long-term implementation 
of additional security regulations on this community. 
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The immediate reaction will most likely be the imposition of Marsec 3 
conditions,309 which is a virtual shut-down of all port activity in the port where the attack 
occurred, if not nationwide.  Additionally, the local Captains of the Port (COTP) will 
likely issue COTP orders directing that all vessels underway in the port area return 
immediately and/or depart the area and that no vessel, large or small, will be permitted to 
move without the express consent of the COTP.  There are severe financial and/or 
criminal penalties outlined in 33 C.F.R. 6.18-1 and 50 U.S.C. 192 associated with 
noncompliance with a COTP order.310  After the order forbidding movement is signed, 
any vessels found moving in a port will be immediately detected and confronted. 
 Also, immediately after such a first attack, there will be great pressure to 
implement severe movement restrictions on all small boats, and the Coast Guard and 
other federal/state/local agencies will need to be ready for the implementation of such a 
plan.  One possible regulatory implementation would be a requirement for tracking 
devices, similar to the AIS system discussed in previous chapters, to be placed on all 
small boats in the United States.  If this requirement is imposed by Congress and/or the 
President, the United States and the Coast Guard should review the success of the 
Singapore small vessel tracking system,311 which already tracks all vessels moving in the 
harbor, for possible implementation here.  Like Singapore, the United States will 
probably have to provide funding for the placement of these movement-tracking beacons 
on the boats in order to ensure that even the poorest boat operator will be able to comply 
with the regulations.  Concurrent with this and other possible new requirements discussed 
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below, Coast Guard personnel numbers will have to be significantly increased in order to 
oversee this new tracking regime and other maritime security responsibilities, or 
Congress will have to temporarily relieve the Coast Guard of responsibility for other 
missions (environmental, living marine resources, vessel safety, etc.) in order to 
concentrate its efforts on the tracking of near shore threats. 
As noted in the DHS’s Report on the National Small Vessel Security Summit312 
one of the regulatory items being proposed concerning the small vessel threat, is a 
requirement that all boat operators carry identification whenever they are operating a 
vessel in U.S. waters.  Undoubtedly, that will become a minimum requirement after the 
first successful attack, but there are likely to be even more requirements placed on 
boaters.   
DHS and the Coast Guard have at times advocated legislation that would give the 
federal government the power to require safety classes and a completion certificate for all 
boaters, and current Commandant Thad Allen has supported the idea that all states should 
require licenses for all boaters in their states.313  Currently, only two states, Alabama and 
Connecticut, require licenses for boat operators.314  Some type of nationwide boat 
operating license requirement will also likely become law after the first successful attack.  
The federal and/or all the state governments could also be pressured to legislate 
automatic background checks for all persons desiring to get a license or to purchase a 
vessel, because, like the background checks required for guns and rifles, a small boat 
could be considered a dangerous weapon in the hands of the wrong person after the first 
successful attack. 
The Coast Guard or other law enforcement agencies could then have a database of 
all persons licensed and approved to operate and own a vessel, and will be able to run 
boat operators’ names through the database to confirm that they have met all of the state 
requirements.  While not acting as a guarantee against any small boat terror attack, the 
                                                 
312 DHS, “National Small Vessel Security Summit Report,” 86.  
313 Patrik Jonsson and Ron Scherer, “Got a Boat? You May Need a License,” Christian Science 
Monitor, August 1, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0801/p03s03-ussc.html. 
314 Ibid. 
  104
boat licensing requirement will at least impose another hurdle the potential small boat-
operating terrorist will have to consider if he wants to operate a boat in U.S. waters (to 
perform dry runs of the attack, testing of the vessel engines/maneuverability, etc.) 
without arousing suspicion. 
The Coast Guard and DHS will also almost assuredly create new and significantly 
larger regulatory restricted movement areas in and around port areas that would forbid 
entry to small boats.  Security zones, safety zones, restricted areas, etc., are already in 
effect in hundreds of areas throughout the United States to keep vessels away from 
maritime critical infrastructures, piers, oil refineries, etc.315   
There is also an automatic security zone restricting the movement of any vessel 
within 500 yards of any Navy vessel, i.e., the “Naval Vessel Protection Zone” (NVPZ), 
where the Coast Guard is authorized by 14 U.S.C. 91 to control the anchorage and 
movement of a vessel operating in the vicinity of a U.S. naval vessel.316  A NVPZ is a 
500-yard regulated area of water surrounding a large U.S. naval vessel, providing for the 
safety or security of the vessel.317 Section 91 of 14 U.S.C. also authorizes the Secretaries 
of DHS and the Navy, to control the anchorage and movement of any vessel in the 
``navigable waters'' of the United States to ensure the safety or security of any U.S. naval 
vessel in those waters.  
After the first successful domestic small boat attack, the COTPs will likely 
impose NVPZ-like security zones around all large vessels operating in U.S. waters, and 
create many additional security zones around and near maritime critical infrastructures.  
These new regulations will seriously limit the freedom of movement by small boats near 
port facilities and high value vessels, and could mimic the strict restriction on vessel 
movements within identified shipping lanes as currently used by Israel, noted in Figures 
15 and 16.   
                                                 
315 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 6, 165, and 334, 2006 ed.  
316 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 165, 2006 ed. (The Coast Guard has implemented the 
provisions of 14 U.S.C. 91 by establishing and enforcing Naval Vessel Protection Zones (NVPZ), in 33 
CFR part 165, subpart G.) 
317 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations part 165.2015, 2006 ed. 
  105
As noted above, there are penalties for the violation of these regulated security 
and safety zones, including both civil and criminal elements, and violations of security 
zones and required movement lanes could be strictly enforced, including with deadly 
force.  For example, a boater named Mike Kenealy suddenly found himself facing a 
Coast Guard small boat with blue lights and sirens flashing, with a machine gun pointed 
in his direction, and a Coast Guard helicopter hovering overhead when he inadvertently 
cruised into a security zone around a natural gas tanker being escorted by the Coast 
Guard in Boston Harbor.318  The Coast Guard enforces security zones around natural gas 
carrying tankers around, in part, out of concern that a boat bomb attack could cause the 
cargo to detonate and devastate downtown Boston. Such fear prompted the mayor of 
Boston, Thomas Menino to ask the COTP to ban these ships from Boston Harbor.  
Although the Captain of the Port refused, he did implement stringent restrictions around 
these vessels while they are moving in the harbor, and those restrictions were what snared 
Mr. Kenealy.319 “Our greatest fear is the boater who gets into trouble (in a security zone) 
doesn’t even know what he’s doing wrong, prompting a deadly response by harbor 












                                                 










Figure 14.   Maritime Zones off Israel’s Coast.  Zones K and M are for Palestinian  
Fishermen; Zone L is for Israel Navy and Permitted Vessels Only.321 
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Figure 15.   Shipping Corridors for Large Vessels Approaching and Departing Israel.  
Strict Lane Compliance is Required.322 
The first and subsequent successful small boat attacks may also create a call for 
equipping arriving vessels with anti-small boat attack technologies discussed above, 
including loud hailers, high pressure hoses, remote electronic shut-down technology, etc., 
and may also create an impetus in the shipping industry and Congress to increase the 
ability of vessel hulls to withstand a small boat attack.   
After the large oil spill caused by the M/V Exxon Valdez in 1989, Congress 
passed the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 1990);323 among other mandates, it 
required that all new vessels constructed after 1990 that intended to operate in U.S. 
                                                 
322 Lorenz, “The Maritime Threat to Israel,” Appendix III.  
323 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Title 33 U.S. Code Section 2701 et seq., 2006 ed. 
  108
waters had to be constructed with double hulls to better contain oil spills in the event of a 
collision, grounding, etc.324  Similarly, after a successful small boat attack, Congress 
could mandate that all vessels entering U.S. waters be required to have double plating or 
other explosive-resistant materials on their hulls to better withstand a small boat attack. 
The maritime industry itself must also have contingency plans for actions to be 
taken after the first successful small boat attack.  For example, the cruise ship industry 
could be devastated after a successful small boat attack anywhere in the world.  This 
industry will need to recapture the confidence of the cruising public in order to resume 
operations and attract customers.  Perhaps the cruise industry may have to hire armed 
security vessels to maintain a twenty-four hour maritime security presence around their 
vessels as they move about the oceans and while anchored/moored in ports.  The same 
self defense responsibilities will probably also be applied to all vessels, including 
petroleum tankers and vessels carrying thousands of cargo containers, before they are 
permitted to enter U.S. waters. 
Finally, new international conventions will probably be supported by the United 
States to, among other things, allow nations to “temporarily” enter the territorial waters 
of other nearby nations, when necessary, as part of the world’s attempt to rid the globe of 
terrorists.  New international agreements for information and intelligence sharing would 
also be implemented, both between nations and between industry and its respective 
governments.  In ways similar to the international law regime accepted by all nations, that 
pirates are a scourge and are at war with the entire world, nations must work together, 
both militarily and via their intelligence agencies, to identify, disrupt, deter and/or 
destroy maritime terrorists, the world’s modern day dread pirate scourge. 
 
                                                 
324 “Oil Pollution Act” (OPA 90, Section 4115 (c)(2) states that tank vessels shall be equipped with a 
double hull or “with a double containment system determined by the Secretary of Transportation to be as 
effective as a double hull for the prevention of a discharge of oil.” 
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XI.   CONCLUSION 
The ongoing and real threat of terrorism from small vessels already present within 
U.S. territorial waters needs to be better considered and addressed by DHS, the Coast 
Guard, the Department of Defense, and all other federal, state and local law agencies with 
a nexus to the U.S.’s territorial seas and the maritime industry.  The proven ability of 
maritime terrorists to use small boats to attack large vessels and shore-based 
infrastructures at little cost with devastating results, calls for new and increased 
cooperation between all agencies and the public to detect/deter such events before they 
happen.  Recent successes by pirates using small boats to take over large vessels off 
Somalia and the Middle East, the increasingly successful use of submarine-like small 
vessels by drug smuggling organizations, and the use of small boats to bring the Mumbai 
terrorists ashore in India, should raise the nation’s anxiety concerning the possibility of a 
successful attack small boat attack in U.S. waters. 
To counteract this threat, the nation’s maritime community must by persuaded to 
become more involved in day-to-day participation in the nation’s MDA programs.  To 
accomplish this, the Coast Guard must become more involved in maintaining and 
supporting maritime community involvement groups, following the successful 
Neighborhood-Watch programs in our nation’s cities.  There must be frequent and 
meaningful contact between the Coast Guard and the neighborhood watch-like 
organizations established under this theses’ proposed changes to the AWW program. 
Further, the Coast Guard itself must also implement new tactics to counteract the 
threat.  The vulnerability assessment, intelligence gathering and patrol tactics outlined in 
Operation Focused Lens should be implemented nationwide.  The best way to prevent or 
deter a small boat attack threat in U.S. waters it to detect it before it begins.  By 
examining all the marinas, boat ramps, and other boat-launching areas in the United 
States, and ranking them as to the probability of their being used as a staging area/point-
of-origin for a small boat terrorist attack, the Coast Guard and other local law 
enforcement agencies will be able to direct their efforts in those locations with the highest 
probability of being used as a staging area for such attacks.  Once the high risk areas have 
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been identified and prioritized, the Coast Guard and other government agencies will 
visit/patrol those areas on a much more frequent but random basis in addition to 
providing training on the AWW program to persons present at those marinas.  Finally, 
Coast Guard and other agencies must increase their intelligence-gathering efforts at these 
higher-priority marinas and boat ramps to possibly detect the terrorist’s planning cycle. 
It is also an essential part of the anti-small boat terror planning that new small 
boat detection and deterrent technologies be implemented as they prove their worthiness 
and their risk-reduction benefits justify their costs. These detection efforts should be both 
overt and covert to act as both a deterrent and detection asset.  Finally, the Coast Guard 
and all other agencies, industry and the public need to have contingency plans that can be 
implemented immediately after the first successful attack to minimize the probability of a 
quick subsequent attack elsewhere, to plan for recovery and life saving efforts, and to lay 
long-term plans for the eradication of the small boat terror threat from U.S. waters.  
The above noted reviews of worldwide maritime terrorism, individual lessons 
learned from other nations’ successful responses to the maritime threat, and the increased 
success of pirates and drug smugglers, in coordination with the goals outlined in the DHS 
Small Vessel Security Strategy, led to this author’s recommendations, which are 
summarized as: 
• the local U.S. maritime community members must be persuaded as to the 
importance of the reporting of their observations to the nation’s MDA, and 
the U.S. Coast Guard must have a more hands-on and involved program, 
similar to the land-based Neighborhood Watch program to keep these 
member actively involved; 
• the Coast Guard and other local law enforcement agencies must discover, 
investigate and prioritize those areas that might be used for staging a small 
boat attack and increase their presence and intelligence-gathering efforts 
in those locations; 
• the use of up-to-date detection technology must be a part of any small boat 
attack prevention plan; and  
• the U.S. must be prepared with a plan to respond to the successful small 
boat attack, including recovery and search and rescue operations, along 
with possible increased regulations and restrictions on the maritime 
community to better prevent re-occurrences of a successful attack. 
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